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THE NEW SPECTRUM AUCTION LAW*
Nicholas W. Ailard**
L Introduction
In the summer of 1993, when Congress narrowly approved
President Clinton's deficit reduction package by passing the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA),' it also authorized
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for the first time
to issue microwave spectrum licenses through competitive bidding
* © All rights reserved. This article is for Genevieve Mulderig Allard, Seton Hall
School of Law '89, with hopes it is up to her high standards.
** Nicholas W. Allard is Government Relations Counsel with the firm of Latham &
Watkins. His legislative and regulatory practice in Washington, D.C., includes work
on behalf of the Wireless Cable Association and other communications clients. The
author is a former minority staff counsel to the United States Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee and chief of staff to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY). A Rhodes
Scholar, with degrees from Princeton, Oxford, and Yale, Mr. Allard has written nu-
merous articles and is a frequent speaker on communications issues. The author ac-
knowledges the invaluable assistance ofJames H. Barker, Esquire, legislative specialist
J.O. Wallace and law librarian Scott R. Wales, all of Latham & Watkins. The views
expressed in this article are those of Mr. Allard alone and do not necessarily reflect
those of his clients or of other parties.
I Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993)
(to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter OBRA]. See also HousE
COMM. ON THE BUDGET, CoNF. REPORT TO H.R. 2264, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 213, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 213]; HousE Comm. ON THE
BuDGET, REPORT TO H.R. 2264, H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 245-70
(1993) [hereinafter BUDGET REPORT]. S. 1134, the Senate bill, was ordered reported
from the Senate Budget Committee onJune 22, 1993, however, no written report was
filed. The House of Representatives companion bill, H.R. 2264, passed the House on
May 27, 1993. 139 CoNG. REc. H2970-3302 (daily ed. May 27, 1993). S. 1134 was
considered and passed the Senate on June 23 and 24, 1993. 139 CONG. REc. S7662-
7736, S7815-8070, S8077 (daily ed.June 24, 1993). Subsequently, onJune 25 (debate
began on June 24 and finished in the morning on June 25) H.R. 2264 was considered
and passed the Senate in lieu of S. 1134 as amended. 139 CONG. REc. S7815-8070,
S8077 (daily ed. June 24, 1993). The House agreed to the Conference Report on
Aug. 5, 1993. 139 CONG. REc. H6122-82, H6224-72 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1993). The
Senate agreed to the Conference Report on Aug. 6, 1993. 139 CONG. REc. S10,625-78,
S10,680-750, S10,757-63. The President signed OBRA into law on August 10, 1993.
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procedures for a wide variety of communications uses:2 uses rang-
ing from cellular telephones and subscription television, to radio
controlled cars and garage door openers, to potentially huge
emerging businesses such as, Personal Communications Services.
Congress projects that this so-called auction authority, which com-
pletely revamps the existing system of lotteries and competitive
hearings for assigning federal communications licenses, will gener-
ate over $10.2 billion in federal revenues over five years.3 Current
commercial enterprises alone, which depend on microwave spec-
trum to transmit signals, have annual revenues which easily exceed
$100 billion.4
2 OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002, 107 Stat. at 388-92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
309(j) (1)-(12)). Underlying legislation in the 103d Congress included the Emerging
Telecommunications Technologies Act of 1993, H.R. 707, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) and its accompanying report, H.R. REP. No. 19, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter HousE COMM. REPORT]. H.R. 707 passed the House under suspension of
the rules. 139 CONG. REc. H936-42, H950 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1993). The Emerging
Telecommunications Technologies Act of 1993, S. 335, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
was introduced on February 4, 1993. 139 CONG. REc. 51384 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993).
It was ordered reported with amendments by the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee on May 25, 1993, however, no report was filed. 139 CONG.
REc. D575 (daily ed. May 25, 1993). See also Emerging Telecommunications Technologies
Act of 1993: Hearings on S.335 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
3 Originally, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that under the
Senate bill, S. 335, spectrum auctions of available spectrum would raise revenues by
$7.2 billion through 1998. Letter from Robert D. Reischauer, CBO Director, to Sena-
tor Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC) (June 21, 1993) (on file with the Seton Hall Legislative
Journal). See also BUDGET REPORT, supra note 1, at 252. As a result of subsequent
amendments expanding the scope of the authorizing language, the revenue projec-
tion increased from $7.2 billion to $10.2 billion. On Sept. 14, 1993, while testifying
before the House Budget Committee during its mid-session budget review, Reis-
chauer explained that the Administration figure was $12.6 billion, the CBO estimate
was $7.2 billion and the "congressional accounting, I believe, was 10.2." FEDERAL
NEws SERV., HOUSE BUDGET Comm. REGARDING THE MID-SESSION REvIEw; TESTIMONY
OF ROBERT REISCHAUER, DIREcTOR OF CONGRESSIoNAL BUDGET OFFIcE 14 (Sept. 14,
1993). See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFicE, A CBO STUDY. AUCTIONING RADIO
SPECTRUM LICENSES ix-xi (Mar. 1992) [hereinafter CBO STUDY] (summarizing esti-
mates and assumptions).
4 H.R. REP. No. 634, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). "Operating revenues from
domestic telecommunications services are expected to reach $170 billion in 1992, and
shipments of telephone and radio communications equipment would be worth more
than $70 billion during the same year." CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at 1 (citing Depart-
ment of Commerce, Int'l Trade Admin., Industrial Outlook, Jan. 1992, at 28-1, 29-1, 30-
1). "Although there is no readily available estimate of the contribution of radio fre-
quency assignments to the value of the public goods and services, one rough calcula-
tion indicates an annual level ranging from $34 billion to $178 billion." CBO STUDY,
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Early in 1993, the new democratic administration signalled
strong support for broad auction authority through Commerce
Secretary, Ronald H. Brown.5 Later, during consideration of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation bill, spectrum auction authority, a
historically controversial proposal, which had several unsuccessful
forerunners in previous Congresses,6 enjoyed bipartisan support in
supra note 3, at 6 (citing Molly Macauley, "Some Spectrum Value Calculations" (re-
marks before the Annenberg Washington Program Conference "Spectrum Allocation:
Rethinking the Invisible Resource," Apr. 30, 1991)).
5 Letter from Ronald H. Brown, Secretary of Commerce, to Senator Daniel K.
Inouye (D-HI), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Communications (Mar. 15, 1993)
[hereinafter Brown letter] (on file with the Seton Hall LegislativeJournao. See also Clin-
ton Administration Endorses Large Spectrum Auctions, Comm. DAILY, Mar. 18, 1993, at 2
(summarizing letter to Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA) from Acting NTIA Director
Thomas Sugrue).
6 For example, in the relatively recent past, during the 100th Congress, President
Ronald Reagan proposed an auction of spectrum licenses which failed to be enacted
by Congress. See OrnCE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF =H U.S. GovwRN-
MEN-r, FiSCAL Y.AR 1989, at 5-167, 5-168 (1988). In the 101st Congress, on July 21,
1989, Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell (D-MI) introduced
H.R. 2965, Emerging Telecommunications Technology Act. Hearings were held on
November 2, 1989, February 8, 1990, and April 30, 1990. Emerging Telecommunications
Technologies: Hearings on H.R. 2965 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance of the House of Representatives Comm. on Energ and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990). The bill was reported from the full committee, H.R REP. No. 634, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), and passed the House on July 30, 1990. 136 CONG. REC.
H5822-27, H5879 (daily ed.July 30, 1990). The measure died on the Senate calendar.
On January 15, 1991, in the House, Chairman Dingell reintroduced the bill as H.R.
531, the Emerging Telecommunications Technologies Act of 1991. 137 CONG. REC.
H512 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1991). Further hearings were held. Emerging Telecommunica-
tions Technologies: Hearings on HR. 531 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance of the House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 531]; Emerging Telecommunications Technolo-
gies: Hearings on H.R. 1407 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce (pt. 2), 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 531, pt. 21. ByJune 18 the reported bill had 48
cosponsors. H.R. REP. No. 113, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). H.R. 531 passed the
House on July 9, 1991. 137 CONG. REc. H5272-79 (daily ed. July 9, 1991). In the
meantime, Senate Communications Subcommittee Chairman Daniel Inouye (D-HI)
introduced S. 218, the Emerging Telecommunications Technologies Act of 1991.
Hearings were held on April 11, 1991. Telecommunications Technologies Act of 1991:
Hearings on S. 218 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transp., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). S. 218 was reported from
committee on June 28, 1991. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, ScrENcE, AND TRANsP.,
REPORT ON S. 218, S. REP. No. 93, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter SENATE
Comm. REPORT]. A compromise agreement drafted by Senator Inouye (D-HI) and
Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) to be offered as a substitute amendment to the bill failed
to make it to the Senate floor during 1992, which concluded consideration of the
measure in the 102d Congress.
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the 103d Congress.7 FCC Acting Chairman, James H. Quello, her-
alded auctions as an efficient tool for the administration of a valua-
ble national resource." Ultimately, President Clinton even used
the auction proposal as a rallying point for passage of his entire
budget plan.9
Soon the FCC will begin a mammoth government auction of
the public airwaves just as America is poised to plunge into a stun-
ning new era of wireless communications.' 0 The sweeping new
auction law directs the FCC to flesh out the myriad details required
7 See House Panel Measure Would Allow Action of Radio Airwaves, WALL ST. J., May 7,
1993, at B4; Mike Mills, Auctions of Frequencies Sets Up a 21st Century Marketplace, 51
CONG. Q., 1137-39 (1993); Mark Lewyn, Airwaves for Sale: Contact Bill Clinton, Bus. WK.,
May 10, 1993, at 37; Spectrum Auction Bill Approved By House Pane COMM. DAILY, May
12, 1993, at 1. The 1992 Budget Proposal was closely related to auction proposals of
the Bush Administration, and tracks the recommendations of the Department of
Commerce. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPr. OF COMM.,
U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY. AGENDA FOR THE FUTrUR (Feb. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter U.S. SPECrRUM MANAGEMENT POuCY]. In the Senate, several influential Republi-
can Senators had previously endorsed spectrum auctions including Minority Leader
Robert Dole (R-KS), Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT),
a member of the Senate Communications Subcommittee. See 137 CONG. REC. 513,390
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole) (proposing that auction revenues
be used to offset increased spending on unemployment compensation); Inouye Now
Open to Stevens Auction Proposa BROADCASTING, Oct. 21, 1991, at 29 (where Sen. Ste-
vens proposed using auction revenues for deficit reduction); 137 CONG. REc. S6982-
83 (daily ed. June 3, 1991) (statement of Sen. Burns) (generally proposing that auc-
tion revenues be used to pay for building telecommunications infrastructure). Addi-
tionally, Budget Committee Banking minority member, Senator Pete Domenici (R-
NM), proposed that spectrum auctions be tied to deficit reduction. 137 CONG. REC.
S14,011 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1991) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
8 Letter from James Quello, FCC Acting Chairman, to Senate Commerce Com-
mittee Chairman Ernest Hollings (D-SC) (June 23, 1993) (on file with the Seton Hall
Legislative Journal).
9 On Thursday, July 22, 1993, President Clinton, Vice President Gore and Com-
merce Secretary Brown hosted a wireless technology fair on the White House lawn to
demonstrate the future wireless applications that could be auctioned off under Title
VI of OBRA, Communications Licensing and Spectrum Allocation Improvement.
President Clinton strongly backed spectrum auctions, citing Congressional Budget
estimates of $7.2 billion that could be raised for deficit reduction as well as at least
300,000jobs that would be created. The President described the auction authority as
an information age "gold mine" comparable to the Alaskan oil finds and the Califor-
nia gold rush of 1849. For a transcript of the President's remarks, see 29 WEEKLY
COMP. PRs. DOc. 1418-20 (July 22, 1993). See also Change Is Coming: An Update on the
President's Economic Plan, TiME MORNING BRIEFING (Democratic Nat'l Comm. July 22,
1993); Clinton Sees Spectrum Auctions Leading to Jobs, Deficit Reduction, COMM. DAILY, July
23, 1993, at 1.
10 The Great PCS Airwaves Auction, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1993, at A20 (opinion
editorial).
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to start auctioning licenses by mid-1994. On September 23, 1993,
the FCC initiated its rulemaking designed to address the many reg-
ulatory issues left unanswered by Congress." Comprehensive new
rules for conducting auctions must be promulgated by March 8,
1994.12 Spectrum auction procedures will first be put to the test
when the FCC begins to auction off spectrum licenses two months
later, on May 7, 1994, for Personal Communications Services
(PCS) '3 -a new generation of communications devices that
promises to allow users to receive and send voice, data, paging and
possibly video anywhere in the country using portable hand-held
devices and a single phone number.'4
The Act has several ambitious goals including: encouraging
swift and efficient development of emerging communications tech-
nologies, such as PCS; encouraging economic opportunities for
small businesses and other designated groups; and raising revenue
for deficit reduction. 5 The Act first requires the FCC to identify
any large block of the spectrum being used inefficiently for reallo-
11 58 Fed. Reg. 53,489-91 (1993) (notice of proposed rule making). For a full text
of this notice of proposed rule making, see Implementation of Section 309(0) of the
Communications Act Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253 (FCC, adopted
Sept. 23, 1993, released Oct. 12, 1993) (notice of proposed rule making) [hereinafter
Auction NPRM].
12 OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002(d) (1), 107 Stat. at 396.
1S OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002(d) (2) (B), 107 Stat. at 397.
14 The FCC defines broadband PCS as "[r]adio communications that encompass
mobile and ancillary fixed communication services that provide services to individuals
and businesses and can be integrated with a variety of competing networks." Amend-
ment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services,
No. 90-314, (FCC, adopted Sept. 23, 1993, released Oct. 22, 1993) (second report and
order) [hereinafter PCS Order]. According to the FCC:
PCS is widely predicted to usher in an era of mobile telecommunications
technology that will permit access to an array of voice, data, and video
communications services regardless of where a subscriber may be located.
PCS will offer the American public a variety of new mobile services, tech-
nologies, and equipment that will operate at home, at work or on the
street. Equipment proposed for PCS includes small, lightweight wireless
telephone handsets; computers that can communicate over the airwaves
wherever they are located; and portable facsimile machines and other
graphic devices.
FCC News Release, New Personal Communications Services Established, No. 90-314 (Sept.
23, 1993). See also Edmund L. Andrews, F.C.C. Clearing Airwaves for an Era Without
Wires, N.Y. TrmEs, Sept. 20, 1993, at Al.
15 See OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 3090) (3) (A)-(D)).
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cation to emerging technologies.' 6 The Act then dictates that the
FCC devise and use an auction method for assigning new licenses,
rather than the current lottery or comparative hearing methods
being used in most cases." Congress intends that the efficiency
and fairness of auctions will help to launch an entirely new tele-
communications sector, including a PCS industry marketing ad-
vanced wireless technology. Some estimates predict that eventually
this could generate annual revenues of $40 billion and reach 60
million subscribers.' 8
This article describes the new statutory auction provisions and
analyzes the prospects for the legislative objectives to be achieved.' 9
First, the article reviews the background and legislative history of
the new competitive bidding provisions and then summarizes the
key provisions of the statute. The issues left to the FCC by Con-
gress are considered in the context of other related developments,
such as the FCC's new rules for the development of PCS and the
likely efforts by scam artists and speculators to use the upcoming
auctions as an opportunity to raise large amounts of money from
16 See id. § 6001, 107 Stat. at 380-83 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 923). See also id.
§ 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 391 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309() (10)).
17 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (1)). See also id.
§ 6002(e), 107 Stat. at 397.
18 Arthur D. Little, a consulting firm in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has estimated
that PCS will serve 60 million customers in the United States by the year 2005. CBO
STUDY, supra note 3, at 30 (citing Arthur D. Little, Inc., Statement before the FCC en
banc Hearing on Personal Communications Services, Dec. 5, 1991). A study by Telo-
cator concludes that the PCS market could be from 60-90 million subscribers by the
year 2002. PCS Order, supra note 14, at para. 16 & app. A (Telocator comments are
on file with the FCC as appendix A in the PCS Order). See also Andrews, supra note
14; Cindy Skrzycki, FCC Prepares to Carve up New Portable Phone Frontier, WAsH. PosT,
Sept. 16, 1993, at D12. By comparison, the $8.5 billion cellular industry has 13 mil-
lion subscribers using cellular telephones and 11,000 new customers each day. Cellu-
lar Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), Cellular Industy Counts 13
Million Subscribers Rising Revenue, Falling Monthly Bills Reported on Eve of 10th Anniversary,
Oct. 12, 1993, at 1 (available from CTIA, Washington, D.C. 1993).
19 This article focuses on the issues relating to the new authority to conduct spec-
trum auctions. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore significant statutory
provisions that relate to other important aspects of spectrum regulation also included
in Title VI of OBRA such as, the regulatory status of PCS providers and other mobile
radio services and the new authority to impose FCC users' fees. See OBRA, supra note
1, § 6002(b), 107 Stat. at 392-96 (amending 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(n), 332); id. § 6003(a),
107 Stat. at 397-400 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 159); Implementation of Sections
3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services,
58 Fed. Reg. 53,169 (1993).
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unwary investors with little prospect of winning a bid, much less
ever taking the new technologies to market.
The article concludes that the success of the upcoming auc-
tions will be determined by the nature of what is offered for sale as
well as the particular method and rules chosen to auction licenses
in the pending rulemaking. That is, the federal agencies with juris-
diction over policies and regulations governing the use of spec-
trum largely determine the market value of what will be sold at
auctions. Decisions such as the FCC's recent PCS order,20 will have
a major impact on whether the upcoming auctions succeed or fail
in fulfilling the statutory objectives. The article also predicts, based
on the experiences of investor fraud and tele-marketing scams re-
lating to the past cellular and wireless cable lotteries, that an on-
slaught of similar efforts to manipulate the auction process and to
target unsophisticated, unwary small investors will result. The FCC,
however, is limited in its ability to cope with such abuses. A con-
certed, advanced effort in federal and state enforcement and con-
sumer protection authorities, along with legitimate industry
groups, is essential to adequately protect the public. Finally, the
article concludes that the switch to auctions will be accompanied
by a considerable and predictable period of adjustment, confusion
and litigation. Spectrum auctions are not likely to be any magical
panacea for the ills of lotteries and comparative hearings. The
FCC will be challenged to develop an auction methodology which
minimizes these consequences and achieves over the long term the
transactional efficiencies expected by proponents of spectrum
auctions.2'
20 PCS Order, supra, note 14. The PCS Order determines the amount of spec-
trum, the conditions and restrictions on the use of the spectrum, and the eligibility
requirements for PCS licenses. Id. See also Narrowband Personal Communications
Services, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,681 (1993).
21 The Author is indebted to the seminal work of Professor Thomas W. Hazlett,
Director of the Program on Telecommunications Policy, Institute of Government Af-
fairs, University of California, Davis, for his generosity in sharing working papers and
comments, and particularly for his original insights into the linkage between alloca-
tion and assignment decisions as well as spectrum scarcity issues. The work of Profes-
sor Barry Nalebuff of the Yale University School of Organization and Management on
the applications of game theory to business decisions, and his help in understanding
the mechanics of auction options, has also been invaluable. See generally AviNAsH K.
Dixrr & BARRVJ. NALEBuF, THINKING STRATEGIcALLY (W.W. Norton & Co. 1991).
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1. Bakground
The radio spectrum is composed of naturally occurring elec-
tromagnetic radiating energy. This natural resource, unlike oil,
gas, and minerals, is non-depletable but finite.22 The spectrum is
an array of electric and magnetic rays arranged in order of their
frequency measured in wavelength or cycles.23 "Frequency" is the
word used to describe the number of waves or cycles whose peaks
pass through a fixed point in a fixed time.24 One cycle per second
is called a hertz (Hz) .25 The usable radio spectrum currently ex-
tends from 3000 Hz (3 kilohertz, KHz) to 300 billion Hz (300
gigahertz, GHz). These frequencies are situated above the audible
sound frequencies and below the visible light frequencies. 26 This
spectrum is the signal delivery medium that makes possible all wire-
less communications including uses such as mobile radio, short-
wave radio, commercial radio, television broadcasting, wireless
cable subscription television, direct broadcast satellite television,
microwave telephone relays, cellular telephones, navigational radio
and satellite transmission.
Two federal agencies have authority over the microwave spec-
trum in the United States. The National Telecommunications
22 Technology consistently expands the supply of usable spectrum by increasing
our ability to use existing spectrum (e.g. compression technology) and by developing
ways to use new, previously unused spectrum. Hazlett and others argue that the fed-
eral government has historically created false scarcity through its spectrum licensing
policies. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33J. L. & EcoN. 133, 136-39 (1990); THOMAS W. HAZLETT, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF RADIO SPEcTRUM AucmONS (forthcoming Jan. 1994) [hereinafter THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY] (on file with the author); George Gilder, What Spectrum Shortage?,
FORBES, May 27, 1991, at 324-32; U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY, supra note 7, at
119-26; CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at 5-7.
23 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE 1992 WORLD AD mis-
TRATIvE RADIO CONFERENCE 30 (Nov. 1991) [hereinafter OTA; HARVEYJ. LEVIN, THE
INVISIBLE RESOURCE 15-39 (1971).
24 OTA, supra note 23, at 29. See also LEVIN, supra note 23, at 15; WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 492 (9th ed. 1986) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY];
HOUSE COMM. REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
25 WEBSTER'S DICTIONA', supra note 24, at 567. The term "hertz" is named after
the early radio innovator, Heinrich R. Hertz. Id. One million Hz is a megahertz
(MHz).
26 HousE COMM. REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. See CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at 2-4.
The microwave spectrum is a subset of the universe of electromagnetic spectrum
which extends below to very low frequency infrasonic waves and above to the ex-
tremely high cosmic-ray waves. Id.
27 The Communications Act of 1934 divides jurisdiction over spectrum between
[Vol. 18:13
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and Information Administration (NTIA) within the United States
Department of Commerce is responsible, among other things, for
allocating, assigning, and maintaining efficient use of the spectrum
assigned to government users.28 In recent years NTIA has also
been the lead agency for developing and coordinating federal
spectrum policy.
29
The FCC is responsible for the spectrum used by private sector
and all non-federal government users. The FCC's spectrum man-
agement responsibilities are similar to NTIA; licensing the use of
discrete frequencies for private commercial and other non-federal
(e.g. educational) uses, and regulating the use of such spectrum.
The FCC allocates, assigns, and regulates spectrum pursuant to the
Communications Act of 1934, which mandates that the FCC up-
hold "the public interest, convenience and necessity." 0
A constraint on the use of spectrum is the ability to send or
receive signals without interference from the signals of other
users.3 ' Almost all of the currently usable spectrum is allocated
the FCC and the President. Under § 305 of the Act the President retains the author-
ity over frequencies used by the federal government. 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1991). The
President has delegated this authority to the Secretary of Commerce, who has dele-
gated it in turn to the Administrator of the NTIA. See Exec. Order No. 12,046, 3
C.F.R. § 158 (1978), reprinted as amended in 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1991). There are no
statutory federal and nonfederal frequency bands, therefore, specific allocations for
either of these broad uses are made pursuant to agreements between the NTIA and
the FCC. See U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT Poucy, supra note 7, at 17.
28 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1991). See also BUDGET REPORT,
supra note 1, at 249. According to the Senate Committee Report accompanying S.
218:
NTIA has jurisdiction over approximately 40 percent of the frequencies
below 5 GHz. About 13 percent of the frequencies below 5 GHz are allo-
cated exclusively to the Federal Government. This figure includes a
number of frequencies on the low end of the spectrum that are not com-
mercially useful. In the most valuable bands, the Federal Government has
exclusive access to a higher percentage of frequencies. For instance,
above 28 percent of the frequencies between 3 MHz and GHz are exclu-
sively allocated to the Federal Government. Above 33 percent of the fre-
quencies in the high frequency band alone (between 3 MHz and 30 MHz)
are allocated exclusively to the Federal Government.
SENATE Comm. REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
29 See, e.g., National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
Telecom 2000 (Oct. 1988) (available from the U.S. Government Printing Office);
U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT PoUcY, supra note 7, at 17-84.
30 47 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 303, 307(a), 308, 309, 316 (1991).
31 One way to minimize interference is to allocate different frequencies to differ-
ent uses. Another is to impose geographic limitations on how far a signal can be sent,
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and much of it is heavily used. 2 The scarcity of spectrum tends to
limit competition from new entrants and to increase the costs of
using spectrum to business and consumers. Similarly, the lack of
unassigned, usable spectrum that is permitted to be used for pio-
neering technologies tends to stifle and delay the introduction and
full development of such technologies.3 3 In order to promote in-
novative uses such as PCS, the FCC must reallocate spectrum for
PCS use from existing uses and consolidate and relocate the in-
cumbent users of the frequencies newly allocated for PCS use. For
example, over the summer of 1993, the FCC issued an order which
set forth the timetable and procedures for moving out and relocat-
ing over the next three years the incumbent users of the spectrum
that PCS will soon occupy.3 4
enforced for example by antenna height and power restrictions. Limiting the time of
day a frequency may be used also, in effect, allows a particular frequency to be reused.
So-called "compression" technology enables more information to flow over the same
spectrum without interference by converting analog signals to digital signals for
transmission.
32 The FCC contends that virtually all of the spectrum below 20 GHz is being uti-
lized currently. The frequencies above 20 GHz are utilized for fewer applications
because of the limits of the current state of technology. ButGEr REPORT, supra note 1,
at 250. According to the Budget Report:
Currently, commercial and public safety users are finding a substantial
shortage of frequencies available for assignment. Existing congestion cre-
ates short-term problems for users, especially in some urban areas where
spectrum is in high demand by private sector and non-federal users, such
as public safety agencies. Give the current congested state of the spec-
trum, the ability to accommodate new spectrum-dependent technologies
is severely limited.
Id. at 248. See also HousE Comm. REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4.
33 Some argue that spectrum scarcity is a regulatory illusion caused by output re-
strictions mandated politically. These restrictions arguably discourage economic effi-
ciency and investment in ways to make greater use of spectrum. See supra note 22.
34 See Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New
Telecommunications Technologies, 8 F.C.C.R. 6589 (1993) (third report and order
and memorandum opinion and order). For licensed services, the FCC has provided
for two negotiation periods. The first period is a fixed two-year period commencing
with the FCC's acceptance of applications for new technology services designed to
prevent disruption of existing 2 GHz microwave operations. During this period, vol-
untary negotiations on relocation may, but are not required to, take place between
new technology providers and affected microwave licensees. ME at para. 15. The sec-
ond period is a one-year mandatory negotiation period, triggered at any time after the
two-year voluntary period by an emerging technology licensee's written request to an
existing microwave licensee to negotiate relocation terms. The parties are required to
negotiate in good faith. The one-year mandatory negotiation period is designed to
ensure that microwave incumbents are not faced with sudden demands for involun-
tary relocation after the initial two-year voluntary negotiation period. Id. at para. 16.
SPECTRUM AUCTION LAW
Once parcels of spectrum are allocated for private use, they
are assigned to licensees. There are three principle methods for
making such assignments: comparative hearings, lotteries, and auc-
tions. Until the 1993 enactment of section 3090) auction author-
ity, the U.S. government did not set a price for assignment of
licenses other than charging a nominal application fee even
though applicants would compete furiously to obtain the right to
use frequencies. Instead, the FCC has historically conducted "com-
parative hearings" to select between competing applicants accord-
ing to the "public interest" standard embodied in its statutory
charter.-- Assigning rights according to an applicant's ability to
further "the public interest, convenience or necessity" originated
in the Radio Act of 19276 and was incorporated seven years later
into the Communications Act of 1934.37 The great irony of this
approach is the very active and lucrative secondary market that
In implementing these procedures, the FCC noted that incumbent licensees subject
to involuntary relocation will have their entire relocation costs paid by the emerging
technology provider, and will benefit to the degree that older equipment is replaced
with state-of-the-art technology. Id- The incumbent users will be relocated to 5 bands
that the FCC has reallocated and channelized above 3 GHz. These details are de-
scribed in a companion order to the third report and order released on the same day.
See Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New Telecom-
munications Technologies, 8 F.C.C.R. 6495 (1993) (second report and order). In its
first report and order, the FCC reallocated to emerging telecommunications technol-
ogies the 1850-1990, 2130-2150, and 2180-2200 MHz bands previously allocated to the
Private Operational-Fixed Microwave service (Part 94), and the 2110-2130 and 2160-
2180 MHz bands previously allocated to the common carrier Domestic Public Fixed
Radio Services (Part 21) and Public Mobile Service (Part 22). See Redevelopment of
Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New Telecommunications Technol-
ogies, 7 F.C.C.R. 6886 (1992) [hereinafter First Report and Order]. The specific serv-
ices that will use this spectrum will be authorized in current and future proceedings
addressing specific services that use emerging technologies. The first of these pro-
ceedings addresses personal communications services (PCS). PCS Order, supra note
14. See also Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Com-
munications Services, 7 F.C.C.R. 5676 (1992) (notice of proposed rule making and
tentative decision); First Report and Order, supra note 34.
35 47 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 303, 307(a), 308, 309, 316 (1991). The Communications
Act of 1934 states that the FCC must regulate "so as to make available... a rapid,
efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with ade-
quate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, [and]
for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1991).
36 The phrase appears in §§ 4, 9, 11 and 21 of the Radio Act of 1927. Hazlett
traces the history of the judicial and legislative evolution of the public interest stan-
dard in colorful detail. See Hazlett, supra note 22, at 152-58.
37 See Anne P. Jones & Harry W. Quillan, Broadcasting Regulation: A Very Brief His-
toy, 37 FED. Comm. LJ. 107 (1985).
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arose after the original license was given away by the government
and then transferred for large sums to another party with the origi-
nal licensee reaping the windfall, rather than the public. For de-
cades the annual loss of billions to the treasury was tolerated under
the pretense that comparative hearings established a formal proce-
dure to divide the public interest." This myth eventually was flat-
tened by the weight of the incoherent rationales for comparative
hearing decisions and the heavy-handed political influence ped-
dling that often determined the outcome of a comparative hear-
ing." This alone was insufficient to evoke a change.
Comparative hearings, which are costly and time consuming,
became a very large drain on agency resources.' For years the
FCC sought to assign frequency rights by lottery or auction primar-
ily due to budgetary concerns.4 Finally, authority to use random
selection (lotteries) was contained in the Senate version of the Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.42 Consequently, the cur-
rent method of allocating spectrum is a system of lotteries wherein
a number of applications are accepted by the FCC, which then
selects the licensee randomly.43
8 Hazlett, supra note 22, at 135 (reprinting chart of billions of dollars lost from
zero-priced spectrum allocation). See also Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at 13 n.21.
39 See examples and anecdotes in THE PoLrrcAL ECONOMY, supra note 22. See also
R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 35-36 (1959)
(noting dryly that the FCC has come into public eminence because of the pressure
applied to influence comparative hearings by politicians and businessmen "who often
use methods of dubious propriety"); Hearings on Investigations of Regulatory Comm'ns
and Agencies Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
40 See EvAN KWEREL & ALEX D. FELER, USING AuCrONS TO SELETr FCC LICEN Es 3
n.6 (FCC, Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper Series No. 16, 1985). The authors
discuss the ineffectiveness and cost of comparative hearings and note that the former
FCC Commissioner, Glen 0. Robinson, portrayed the comparative hearings as "the
FCC's equivalent of the Medieval trial by ordeal." a at 3 n.6 (citing Dissenting State-
ment of Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson In Re: Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc., 60
F.C.C.2d 372 (1976)). See also Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, 45 Fed.
Reg. 29,335 (May 2, 1980); Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 46 Fed. Reg. 58,110
(Nov. 30, 1981).
41 See KWEREL & FELKER, supra note 40, at 4-7.
42 See BUDGET REPORT, supra note 1, at 248. This provision was specifically in-
tended to remedy a backlog of license applications for low-power television. There
was no lottery provision in the House bill and no House hearings on the subject. Id.
43 The power to engage in lotteries is contained in 47 U.S.C. § 309(i). This provi-
sion was added by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
sec. 1242, § 309, 95 Stat. 736-37 (1981) and was amended in Communications Amend-
ments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, sec. 115, § 309(i), 96 Stat. 1087, 1094-95 (1982).
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The FCC first used lotteries to assign licenses for cellular tele-
phone operators and since that time has been using lotteries exten-
sively to award a variety of licenses, including licenses for wireless
cable subscription television.44 Over the last decade, the cellular
and wireless cable lotteries have exhibited many of the same, if not
worse, problems that arose in comparative hearings. Initially, lot-
teries promised to be faster and less costly to society than compara-
tive hearings. Soon, however, the financial windfalls enjoyed by
lottery winners for little up front expense attracted huge numbers
of applicants for even relatively low value license assignments.45 At
44 "Wireless Cable" is defined by the FCC as "a multichannel video distribution
medium that resembles cable television, but that uses microwave channels rather than
coaxial cable or wire to transmit programming to the subscriber." Amendment of
Parts 1, 2, and 21 of the Commission's Rules Governing Use of the Frequencies in 2.1
and 2.5 GHz Bands, 7 F.C.C.R. 3266, 3267 (1992) [hereinafter Amendment of Parts 1,
2, and 21] (notice of proposed rule making) (citations omitted). The term "wireless
cable" does not imply that the service constitutes cable television for any statutory or
regulatory purpose. See Cable Television System Definition, 5 F.C.C.R. 7638, 763941
(1990) (report and order), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Beach Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1992); 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.900-.915 (1992). Wireless
cable systems use the Super High Frequency (SHF) portion of the radio frequency to
transmit multiple channels of video programming from terrestrial transmitters to
small antennas mounted on subscribers' rooftops. Wireless cable is able to provide
multichannel programming using a combination of the following services: multipoint
distribution service (MDS), multichannel multipoint distribution service channels in
the 2596 MHz to 2644 MHz frequency bands (MMDS), instructional fixed television
services (IFTS), and the former operational fixed service (OFS). Through its combi-
nation of services, wireless cable can now provide up to 33 channels. The FCC first
allocated spectrum for wireless cable over a decade ago. See Amendments of Parts 2,
21, 74 and 94 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations in regard to Frequency
Allocation to the Instructional Television Fixed Service, the Multipoint Distribution
Service, and the Private Operational Fixed Microwave Service, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203, 1228
(1983); Various Methods of Transmitting Program Material to Hotels and Similar Lo-
cations, 99 F.C.C.2d 715 (1983) (memorandum opinion and order). The FCC's rules
and policies governing wireless cable have been significantly modified in recent years.
See Amendment of Parts 1, 2, and 21 of the Commission's Rules Governing Use of the
Frequencies in the 2.1 and 2.5 GHz Bands, 7 F.C.C.R. 3266 n.8 (1992). ITFS channels
are not assigned 1y lottery and are exempt from the new auction requirements.
BUDGET REPoRT, supra note 1, at 253-54; Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at para. 23 n.5.
45 For example, lottery winners of the rural cellular license for Columbia County,
Wisconsin, sold it for $623 million 165 days after a construction permit was issued.
Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at para. 34 n.22. See also Peter Passell, Radio Waves can
be Solid Gold, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 4, 1991, at 24 (reporting 60,000 applications received in
two days for a license to provide data transfer services); Cindy Skrzycki, Congress Mulls
New WaysforFCC to Divide Broadcast Spectrum, WASH. PosT,June 26, 1991, at FI (report-
ing that 59,000 applicants entered a lottery within days of the FCC announcing it
would assign a portion of radio airwaves). According to the FCC mobile services staff,
as of October 15, 1993, there are still approximately 10,000 pending cellular license
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one point the FCC was forced to call in a structural engineer to
determine whether the FCC's floor could bear the weight of the
accumulated paper due to the volume of applications for cellular
licenses.46
So called "application mills" employing "infomercials" and
boiler room telephone sales operations would aggressively adver-
tise the availability of licenses and overstate the chances as well as
the value of winning the lottery.47 Gullible small investors, after
responding to slick telemarketed pitches would be charged be-
tween $2000 and $12,000 dollars for the mill to file an application
that only cost the mill $150 or less to file. Often the mills merely
duplicated multiple copies of applications for the same license for
large numbers of their "clients." The chances of winning a license
were virtually nonexistent not only because the application mills
efforts tended to reduce each subsequent applicant's chance for
success, but also because the applications were often facially
defective.48
applications, including about 500 for a small unserved area outside of the Los Angeles
market. There are now about 12,000 pending wireless cable applications even though
the FCC ordered a freeze on all wireless applications almost two years ago. Amend-
ment of Parts 1, 2 and 21 of the Commission's Rules Governing the Use of the Fre-
quencies in the 2.1 and 2.5 GHz Bands, 8 F.C.C.R. 1444 (1993) (noting 20,000
wireless cable application backlog at that time).
46 Telephone Interview with staff at the FCC, Mobile Services Division, Common
Carrier Bureau (Dec. 2, 1993). FCC staff sought assurance that the floor at the FCC
headquarters in Washington, D.C., could support the weight of the numerous applica-
tions filed for cellular licenses. Id. At one point the shelving collapsed at the FCC
offices in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Id.
47 Winning a lottery was not, in itself, enough to start a viable wireless cable busi-
ness. The winner of say four channels in the E or F group of MMDS channels merely
won the right to try to assemble enough additional channels, at least 10-12 more, to
offer a viable multichannel subscription service. The winner also faced the need to
show due diligence in making progress toward becoming operational. In a sense, the
successful lottery applicant won the right to spend more money. See Mary Lu Came-
vale, Fraud Complaints Grow in Young Wireless Cable Field, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1992, at
B2; Joe Flint, Wireless Cable Lotteries Attacked by FTC, BROADCASTiNG, Apr. 20, 1992, at
42; Investor Alert - Edmisten Warns of New High-Tech Cable TV Scam, PR NEwswiRE,
Apr. 14, 1992; Tim Furlong, New Phone Sales Scam, LA. TmMEs, Apr. 14, 1992, at DI;
Rick Brown, Feds Close in on Deceptive Application Mills, BROADCASTING, Jan. 20, 1992, at
32.
48 The backlog has been devastating to the wireless cable industry. See Amend-
ment of Parts 1, 2, and 21, supra note 44; Executive Update, INvESTOR'S Bus. DAMY, July
28, 1993, at 3 (discussing applications mills). Several state attorney generals, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and other regulators have been highly critical of these prac-
tices and opened several investigations. At one point in 1991, the North American
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Consequently, the hoped for benefits of lower administrative
costs and timeliness were lost without any indication that the pro-
cess was any fairer or any better in upholding the public interest.
In fact, there currently is a freeze on review and assignment of
wireless cable spectrum licenses until the FCC can determine how
to deal with the backlog.49
Securities Administrators Association issued a bulletin describing the wireless lottery
schemes as the number one investor fraud in the country. Id.
49 Beginning April 9, 1992, the FCC imposed a "freeze" on the acceptance of appli-
cations for new stations on MDS channels, as well as on ITFS channels available for
full-time limited commercial use. See Amendments of Parts 1, 2, and 21, supra note
44; Amendment of Parts 1, 2, and 21 of the Commission's Rules Governing Use of the
Frequencies in the 2.1 and 2.5 GHz Bands, 8 F.C.C.R. 1444 (1993) [hereinafter Re-
port and Order] (report and order). However, applications for modification of ex-
isting MDS facilities may still be filed. Under existing rules, MDS applications are
filed on a "first come, first serve" basis. If only one acceptable application is filed, the
FCC can grant that application after the conclusion of the 30-day public notice pe-
riod. If more than one application is filed for the same market on the same day, then
the FCC must select one application. For E, F and H channels, this selection is by
lottery. In some instances, applicants may be entitled to a lottery preference based on
minority ownership and/or media ownership diversity. For MDS-1 and MDS-2, the
selection from among mutually exclusive applicants is by comparative hearing.
Once granted, licensees are entitled to a protected service area, the boundary of
which is a 15-mile radius from the transmit site. The freeze will be in effect indefi-
nitely, and likely will not be resolved for several months. Originally, the FCC believed
that the freeze would be lifted by the end of the third quarter of 1993. See id. How-
ever, on July 28, 1993, the FCC issued a public notice concerning the MDS freeze,
which indicated that while there had been much progress towards eliminating the
application backlog, the freeze would not be lifted any time in the near future. See
Press Release, MDS/MMDS Applications Filing Freeze, No. 34165 (FCC July 28,
1993). The FCC noted that the backlog of applications "soon will be reduced to a
point where new applications of an uncontested or routine nature may be processed." I
(emphasis added). Any further steps at lifting the freeze are being carefully weighed,
and the FCC has invited public comment on this matter. According to the staff of the
Common Carrier Bureau, there is great trepidation among FCC staff members about
the potential flood of applications which will be fied once the freeze is lifted. Appar-
ently, the telemarketers continue to churn out applications, promising investors that
they will be filed once the freeze is lifted.
To combat the application problem and allow wireless cable to continue as a
viable alternative to traditional cable, the FCC recently issued several rule changes to
deter the filing of speculative applications. These include disallowing settlement
groups, prohibiting applicants from holding any interest in more than one applica-
tion for the same channel, and restricting the transfer of MDS applications. See Re,
port and Order, supra.
BeginningJanuary 2, 1992, the FCC began accepting applications from commer-
cial entities, such as wireless cable operators, for ITFS frequencies, subject to certain
restrictions. These commercial applications are subject to the MDS filing freeze dis-
cussed above. Moreover, on February 11, 1993, the FCC imposed a "freeze" on the
filing of applications for all new ITFS facilities and applications for major changes of
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According to the Budget Committee Report accompanying
section 3080):
[L]otteries have been characterized by "get rich quick" appeals
by firms that would submit an application for a fee, so-called
"licensing mills," and by licenses landing in the hands of those
ill equipped to build or operate a service properly utilizing radio
spectrum.
In addition, the lottery system is widely criticized for failing
to meet the FCC's public interest standard and for encouraging
unproductive speculation for spectrum licenses. In the case of
the spectrum lottery for cellular licenses, the rule adopted by
the FCC for the lottery system failed to contain adequate finan-
cial and technical qualifying standards or anti-trafficking re-
quirements, thereby enabling lottery winners subsequently to
sell their licenses, sometimes at substantial sums, to legitimate
parties who actually built the cellular system." °
existing facilities. Amendment of Part 74 of the Commission's Rule with regard to the
Instructional Television Fixed Service, 8 F.C.C.R. 1275 (1993) (notice of proposed
rule making).
The FCC is also currently considering rule changes that would establish filing
"windows" to permit FCC staff to more efficiently process ITFS applications. When
the rulemaking proceeding is concluded, it is expected that applications may again be
filed under the appropriate procedures. Only accredited educational institutions,
government organizations that provide educational services to enrolled students, and
nonprofit educational organizations that propose to provide educational or instruc-
tional programming to accredited educational institutions are eligible to hold ITFS
licenses. The FCC selects ITFS permittees according to an elaborate point system:
four points for local educational entities; three points for schools; two points if apply-
ing for four or fewer channels in the service area; one point for 21 or more hours of
educational programming; two points for 41 or more hours; and one point for
grandfathered E and F Group ITFS licensees that wish to relocate to other 1TFS fre-
quencies. According to the staff of the Television Services Branch at the FCC's Mass
Media Bureau, however, the freeze is not likely to be removed any time in the near
future. See Amendment of Part 74 of the Commission's Rule with regard to the In-
structional Television Fixed Service, 8 F.C.C.R. 6277 (1993) (where FCC announced it
would process applications already on file, but it would not yet accept new ITFS
applications).
The ITFS freeze was initiated due to different circumstances that have proven to
be more difficult to solve. In cities where wireless cable operators had obtained MDS
licenses, other parties attempted to secure numbers of ITFS licenses from educational
and religious entities, not for the purpose of operating wireless cable systems, but to
lodge interference claims against legitimate operators who wished to establish their
own ITFS channels. Once these licenses were secured, the so-called "greenmailers"
would approach the legitimate operators for payments in order to withdraw their in-
terference claims. The ITFS freeze is expected to remain in place until this problem
is resolved.
50 BuDGET REPORT, supra note 1, at 248.
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In this context, Congress looked to competitive bidding concepts
such as those used to assign rights to other public resources such as
grazing lands, coal, oil and gas leases.5 The word "auction" conveys a
variety of vivid images of fast talking sellers of tobacco leases and farm
equipment and of sedate signalling of bids over tea cups for expensive
artwork in a Sotheby's salon. Competitive bidding procedures, how-
ever, play a role in many private and public transactions including
federal government procurement contracts, financial instruments and
natural resources.52
There are four principal forms of auctions that the FCC will con-
sider as bidding options.5" Perhaps, the most well known form is the
traditional English auction which is open and interactive, typically in-
volving participants in the same room submitting oral bids. The Eng-
lish auction is also commonly referred to as an "ascending price"
auction. The auctioneer begins with a low asking price, often the low-
est price that the seller will accept, the reservation price, and raises
the asking price until only one bidder, the winning bid, is left.54
The Dutch auction is also open and reverses the English proce-
dure by starting with a relatively high asking price and dropping the
price until the first bid, the winning bid, is offered.55 The first and
51 Id. at 249.
52 The FCC has indicated that because it has no background in conducting spec-
trun auctions, it contemplates relying on the experience of other government agen-
cies which have effectively conducted auctions. Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at
para. 18. The CBO study lists several examples including auctions for T-Bills and
short term securities by the U.S. Department of the Treasury; two-stage timber auc-
tions by the U.S. Forest Service; and sealed bid auctions for off-shore oil leases by the
U.S. Department of the Interior. CBO STunv, supra note 3, at 43 & n.12.
53 R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding 25J. ECON. LrrERA-
TuRE 699, 702 (1987). See generally CBO STur', supra note 3, at 42-43; Dixrr &
NALEBuFF, supra note 21, at 318-25.
54 See Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at paras. 38-39 (discussing advantages and
disadvantages). A variant of the ascending bid auction is electronic bidding. Bids can
be submitted electronically by telephone or computer terminals and announced at set
short time intervals. Minimum bid increments are set. Bidding would end at some
predetermined time or after a set period of time had elapsed since the last bid. Id. at
para. 39. Another variant is the so-called Japanese auction, which helps prevent collu-
sion and provides useful information to bidders. The auctioneer asks all parties will-
ing to pay the current price to bid and then continues to raise the price by increments
until only one bidder remains. Once a bidder drops out he cannot bid again. This
protects against manipulation of the bid through rapid escalation of bids followed by
default of the winning bidder in favor of a colluding bidder who had a much lower
second bid.
55 CBO Sruny, supra note 3, at 43.
1993]
SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURZVAL
second-price sealed bid auctions involve submitting written bids that
are closed.56 In the first-price auction the highest bidder wins and
pays the price bid, while in the second-price auction, the highest bid-
der wins but only pays a price equal to that of the second highest-
bidder. 7 Each of the four types of auctions can be used to sell single
unit or multiple-unit items. The form of the auction that will be se-
lected by the FCC to be tested in the 1994 PCS Auction (and special
restrictions placed on the auction to comply with statutory and admin-
istrative requirements) will prove to be critical in determining the suc-
cess of the first experiment with auctioning spectrum.5"
L. Leglative Hitoy
Auctioning spectrum licenses is an old idea.5
9 Economists60
and other commentators61 have long questioned why the federal
government gives valuable spectrum rights away virtually for free.
Although political support for dividing up the airwaves into usable
allotments and selling them to the highest bidder has waxed peri-
odically,62 it has largely waned,63 at least until the 103d Congress.
56 See D=xrr & NAL~aurr, supra note 21, at 322 (discussing the "Vickrey auction" or
"philatelist auction" where the second highest sealed bid wins). See also William
Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16J. FiN. 8 (1961).
57 Id. See also CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at 44.
58 For comprehensive discussions of policy considerations in making this choice,
see CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at 44-47. See also Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at pa-
ras. 36-67.
59 For a comprehensive history of U.S. spectrum regulation and auction proposals
see Hazlett, supra note 22. The subject is addressed more extensively in Hazlett's
forthcoming publication. See THE PoLImcAL ECONOMY, supra note 22.
60 Hazlett credits Leo Herzel as one of the first economists to advocate spectrum
auctions. See Hazlett, supra note 22, at 137 (citing Leo Herzel, Public Interest and the
Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 802-16 (1951)). In a 1959
article, Nobel Laureate R-A. Coase, referring to Herzel's work, also argued for auc-
tioning spectrum licenses with a proposal, still considered radical in many quarters,
that would let the market determine not only the assignment of spectrum blocks, but
the allocation of that spectrum to different communications uses. Coase, supra note
39, at 14-17.
61 See, e.g., RobertJ. Samuelson, The Quiet Giveaway, NEwswEmir, May 13, 1991, at
52; Sell the Dial, N.Y. TimEs, May 9, 1985, at A30.
62 In 1958 Representative Henry Reuss (D-WI) introduced an auction bill for tele-
vision licenses when more than one applicant was qualified. H.R. 11893, 85th Cong.
2d Sess. (1958). See also S.J. Res. 106, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958); S. REP'. No. 1854,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (Commission to investigate utilization of frequencies al-
located to the government). Reform legislation that would have completely revised
the Communications Act of 1934 was introduced without success in the late 1970s by
Representative Lionel Van Deerlin (D-SD), Chair of the House Communications Sub-
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Presidents Carter,' Reagan 65 and Bush 66 supported auction legisla-
tion that failed to become law.
President Clinton's budget request for 1993 also included a
spectrum auction proposal.68 H.R. 707, which provided for spec-
trum reallocation, but not auctions, passed the House on March 2,
committee. See H.R. 13015, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 3333, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). Many related proposals have since been introduced in Congress. See
U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY, supra note 7, at 99-101 (describing support
within government for competitive bidding); WnLLAM B. RAY, FCC: THE Ups AND
DowNs OF RADIO-TV REGULATIONS 150-51 (1990) (providing historical anecdotes re-
garding FCC attempts to charge fees for broadcast licenses).
63 For years the Administration, led by the Office of Management and Budget and
the Congressional Appropriations Committees, would call for spectrum auctions.
However, the Democratic leadership of the principle oversight committees would re-
sist, largely reflecting the staunch opposition of regulated incumbents such as the
broadcasters and later the cellular telephone industry, among others. This phenome-
non is discussed in Hazlett's forthcoming book. See THE POLInCAL ECONOMY, supra
note 22. The principle rationale was that auctions could not uphold the paramount
public interest standard for assigning and regulating spectrum. In addition, it was
feared that auctions would give large, well-financed interests and urban areas advan-
tages over small businesses and rural areas. See U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT PocY,
supra note 7, at 102-11 (discussing opposition).
64 President's Message to Congress Regulatory Reform of the Telecommunications
Industry, PuB. PAPERS 1699, 1702 (1980).
65 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF =H U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1988, at 2-47 (1987).
66 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1990, at 2-37 (1989); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1991, at A-55 (1990); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 3-11 (1991); OFFICE OF MAN-
AGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 2-18
(1992).
67 The 102d Congress failed to enact legislation in 1992, introduced the previous
year, that transferred the use of a large portion of government-held spectrum to pri-
vate use for emerging technologies. House and Senate bills introduced in the first
session of the 102d Congress would have transferred 200 MHz for emerging technolo-
gies. H.R. 531, supra note 6; S. 218, supra note 6. Both the Bush administration and
Senate Republicans opposed these measures because they would have used lotteries
to assign the frequencies. The House had passed H.R. 531 on July 9, 1991, by voice
vote. The Senate Commerce Committee approved S. 218 on May 14, 1991, but never
reported the bill as drafted to the full Senate. Instead, Senators Inouye and Stevens
worked out a compromise that would have allowed experimental auctions for up to 30
MHz, while exempting broadcasters and public safety users. Earlier versions of the
bill had included language offered by Representative Dingell that prohibited the use
of auctions. Subsequently, he agreed to drop this language. However, while the con-
sensus grew on auction legislation, time ran out in the 102d Congress before the work
on the remaining issues was completed. See supriz note 6.
68 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1994, at 18 (1993). During the 1992 Presidential campaign candidate Clinton
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1993. When the President's budget for fiscal year 1994 was re-
leased, however, it included an authority for competitive bidding,
similar to that proposed by Presidents Reagan and Bush.69 H.R.
707 was referred back to the committee, which then began altering
the legislation to include auctions in preparation for budget recon-
ciliation. With the encouragement from Commerce Secretary
Brown, a compromise agreement between Senators Inouye (D-HI)
and Stevens (R-AK), which allowed for a trial auction of 30 MHz,
grew into a general auction authority for the entire 200 MHz Con-
gress reallocated to emerging technologies. 70 When the House
and Senate reported their bills for budget reconciliation, both in-
cluded auction authority language."
The formal legislative history of this particular provision is not
as extensive as one might expect for such an important piece of
legislation, because it became part of the overall budget process
rather than being free standing legislation. 72 The origins, however,
called for federal spectrum auctions. See generally BuL. CLINTON & AL GoRE, PuTrrNG
PEoPLE Fxz.sr How WE CAN ALL CHANGE AMERICA (1992).
69 BUDGET REPORT, supra note 1, at 247.
70 See Brown letter, supra note 5.
71 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 213, supra note 1, at 481.
72 The special circumstances of the budget process operated to minimize the legis-
lative history accompanying the spectrum auction provisions. The rules governing
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) are complex. Reconciliation is a two-
stage process in which Congress endeavors to bring actual spending and revenues in
line with budget projections and the annual budget request of the President. The
first stage involves the passage of a Concurrent Budget Resolution. This resolution
lays out the guidelines for committees ofjurisdiction to follow when making decisions
on budget authority (increasing or decreasing outlays and revenues). The second
stage involves authorizing committees to report their budgetary decisions back to the
Budget Committee, which packages each committees' work as separate titles in
OBRA. The sheer size of the budget undertaking overwhelms particular legislative
issues that would receive much greater attention as stand alone legislation. Reconcili-
ation legislation was first used in 1980 and has been used on an irregular, but continu-
ous basis since, in part because stand alone bills that might fall on their own survive as
part of the larger budget bill which Congress must pass to keep the government func-
tioning. See NiCHoLAs A. MAsrEms, THE CONGRFssIoNAL BUDGET PROCESS, SERIA. No.
CP-1, 103D CONG., 2D SEss. (Comm. Print. 1993); WniuAM G. DAUSTER, BUDGET PRO-
CESS LAW ANNOTATED, S. Doc. No. 22, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Furthermore, an OBRA is a massive undertaking and is usually dominated by tax
provisions, which receive the majority of attention by Congress, the Executive Branch,
national press and public at large. Most OBRAs have been referred to as "Tax bills" in
the press and common vernacular. Less time and freedom is accorded to congres-
sional members to discuss and debate often very important legislative initiatives. In
this case, when President Clinton recognized the spectrum auction proposal as a "bill
payer" or revenue raiser, the proposal was not so much seen in the light of substantive
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of this proposal can be traced to a series of recent budgeting and
legislative initiatives starting with the budget proposal of 1989.7'
By 1991, support had grown for experimental auctions.74 Increas-
ingly, these proposals reflected a developing consensus that
more spectrum should be made available to new private uses and
that the existing methods of assigning licenses were seriously
flawed. 75 Previously, the historical opposition of broadcast inter-
ests and others to even the precedent of charging for spectrum use
for some kinds of licenses would have been sufficient to derail each
policy as much as it was seen as a means to reach the President's goal of $5 billion in
deficit reduction.
Another impediment to extended debate of the spectrum auction issue arose
from the so-called "Byrd Rule." 2 U.S.C. § 644 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). The Byrd
Rule gives individual Senators the opportunity to raise "a point of order" against ma-
terial extraneous to the instructions to an authorizing committee. If the point of or-
der is sustained by the chair, the legislative provision could be stricken from the bill.
The legislative history of OBRA's Title VII is silent on many substantive issues, which
might otherwise have been addressed to avoid a Byrd Rule point of order. However,
the conference report finesses the technicality of the Byrd Rule by incorporating pro-
visions by reference. For example, because of the Byrd Rule conferees removed the
"findings" sections of Title VII "because these provisions do not have a budgetary
impact and could violate the Byrd Rule. However, the conferees believe that these
findings and conclusions are important and lay the predicate for this legislation, and
incorporate the findings of both bills herein by reference." H.R. CoN. REP. No. 213,
supra note 1, at 473-74. More specific to spectrum auctions the conferees said, "The
House Committee Report [BUDGET REPORT, supra note 1] contains many examples of
the types of licenses that would be covered by the competitive bidding procedures
authorized in this Act, which are incorporated herein by reference." I& at 481.
73 The evolution of the current auction statute from 1989 to its enactment in 1993
is discussed in CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at 14-15.
74 Id. at 16. Both sides agreed that a measure should pass that freed up spectrum
for new industries. The Bush Administration and leading Republicans, however,
balked at the idea of freeing up spectrum only to give it away through lotteries. In
1991, the House passed Chairman Dingell's proposal, H.R. 531, which would have
opened up a large block of spectrum but did not include auction authority. The
Senate reported the companion bill, S. 218, out of Committee and the Bush Adminis-
tration threatened to veto the measure unless Congress included authority for FCC
auctions. Hearings were held on Capitol Hill concerning amendments to add auction
authority, but the 102d Congress neither agreed to acquiesce to auctions nor to chal-
lenge Bush on the issue. The House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance held hearings on spectrum auctions in 1991 on February 21, March 12 and
October 9. See Hearings on H.R 531, supra note 6; Hearings on H.R. 531, pt. 2, supra
note 6.
75 In the legislative history, the FCC is blamed for the failure of lotteries. See, e.g.,
BUDGET REPORT, supra note 1, at 248. See also Hearings on H.R. 531, supra note 6, at 89
(exchange of Representative Markey and NTIA AdministratorJanice Obuchowski).
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proposal.76 But the political dynamic changed rapidly. An explicit
exemption in evolving auction proposals for non-subscription
broadcast television licenses and also, perhaps, the ambitious ef-
forts of the broadcast industry in pursuit of other priorities77 con-
strained the ability of broadcasters to effectively and openly oppose
spectrum auctions.7" Finally, by 1993 the imperative of deficit re-
duction and the need to find enormous new sources of federal rev-
enues not only made enactment of this once controversial
provision a certainty, but also created pressure in the late stages of
the legislative process that greatly expanded the coverage of the
new auction law.79 What started as a limited auction experiment
permitting the FCC to choose when to conduct auctions grew to
mandatory auctions for emerging technologies and further esca-
lated to mandatory auctions for a wide array of spectrum licenses
for both new and old uses.8 0 In the final days of fractious debate
76 See CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at 21-22 (discussing the "camel's nose inside the
tent" type of argument against auctions).
77 Such as the must carry/retransmission consent provisions eventually enacted in
the 1992 Cable Act. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competitor Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-55 (1992)).
This Act amended the Communications Act of 1934 by adding new § 614 (47 U.S.C.
§ 534) (must carry) and new § 615 (47 U.S.C. § 535) (retransmission consent). These
provisions and their long history are discussed in Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable
Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 305, 333-45 (1992).
78 Other previous impediments to enactment were removed. For example, con-
cems over the fate of incumbent users of the frequencies that were to be allocated to
PCS and other converging technologies raised by Chairman Hollings and Chairman
Dingell were alleviated. Some issues, however, such as whether to require special pro-
tections for rural interests and to revamp the regulatory regime applicable to all mo-
bile services remained extremely controversial. These concerns were ultimately
reflected in specific provisions ultimately enacted in Title VI of OBRA. See OBRA,
supra note 1, §§ 6001-03, 107 Stat. 379-400 (to be codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
79 A move made by Senator Dole in the course of debate on extending unemploy-
ment benefits to counter the effects of the 1991 recession brought to the forefront
the issue of revenues. This issue eventually would gather support for and propel auc-
tions. President Bush had threatened to veto unemployment benefit extension unless
it complied with the 1990 budget agreement's "pay-as-you-go" provisions. Senator
Dole twice attempted to include spectrum auctions in the unemployment bill as a
means of paying for extra unemployment benefits. Both times the measure failed
after complaints that the relevant committees had not had time to consider auctions
properly. 137 CONG. REc. S11,749 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hol-
lings). But the idea took hold.
80 This rapid expansion had some unintended consequences and would have been
very disruptive to some existing services. After intense lobbying, for example, the
wireless cable industry and others were able to obtain an exemption for most pending
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over OBRA, auction provisions ironically became one of the loco-
motives pulling the legislative vehicle rather than heavy freight pe-
rennially decoupled and left at the station."'
The 1993 Budget Act replaces lotteries with auctions in most
cases.8 2 The legislative history explains that the change was made
principally because of the perceived serious shortcomings of lotter-
ies, or at least in their management. Congress found that the FCC
had failed to institute serious screening procedures to ensure that
spectrum went to parties who actually intended to use it.8" In the
cellular telephone and wireless cable television context, this failure
led to parties applying for and receiving spectrum, and then selling
the spectrum for a substantial sum to other parties who actually
intended to build cellular and wireless cable systems. Congress
found the lottery system unacceptable because it "engendered ram-
pant speculation; undermined the integrity of the FCC's licensing
process and, more importantly, frequently resulted in unqualified
persons winning an FCC license." 4 Congress felt that a system of
competitive bidding would fix these problems, while raising large
sums for deficit reduction. 5
IV Statutory Analysis
Section 3090) authorizes the FCC to issue licenses for use of
the electromagnetic spectrum through a system of competitive bid-
ding if three criteria are met. The FCC is required to use auctions
if: (1) mutually exclusive applications for a license or permit have
applications (the statute allows the FCC to conduct lotteries for applications accepted
for filing prior to July 26, 1993). See 139 CONG. REc. S10,960 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Inouye) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. Inouye] (explaining
§ 6002 (e) (2) rule for existing applications); Inouye Clarifies Deadline in Spectrum Auction
Language, TELrcoMM. RE'., Aug. 16, 1993, at 20. Similar efforts also led to clarifica-
tion in the Conference Committee Report that ITFS frequencies licensed by educa-
tional institutions and used by wireless cable operators would not be subject to
auctions even though wireless cable operators receive compensation from subscribers.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 213, supra note 1.
81 See supra note 9. A mild flap over the tax treatment of licenses failed to derail
the auction proposal. Charles R. Babcock, Wen a Single Sentence Threatens Loss of Mil-
lions; Lobbyist Spots Loophole in Bill's Fine Print, WASH. PoST, July 27, 1993, at A8.
82 OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002(b) (1) (A), 107 Stat. at 392 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 309(i) (1)).
85 BUDGET REPORT, supra note 1, at 248.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 249.
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been accepted for filing by the FCC after July 26, 1993;86 (2) the
applications filed are for an initial license or construction permit;87
and (3) the primary use of the spectrum will or is likely to involve
the licensee's receipt of compensation from subscribers either to
receive or transmit directly communications signals utilizing fre-
quencies on which the licensee is licensed to operate.88
"Accepted for filing" is a term of art that means the applica-
tion has been filed and received some initial review, and public
notice by the FCC has been issued indicating that a license applica-
tion has been filed which is not facially defective. 89 An interesting
issue for the FCC will be whether comprehensive settlements
among competing applicants, reached after mutually exclusive ap-
plications have been filed but before auction, are not mutually ex-
clusive and therefore exempt from the new lottery requirements.
The auctions are only required for initial licenses; the FCC may not
use bidding for renewal or modification of a license. ° The "sub-
scribers for compensation" criterion means essentially that the li-
cense must have paying subscribers and exempts traditional
broadcast license and educational licenses such as those for In-
structional Television Fixed Services. 9 ' The Act curtails the FCC's
discretion to use random selection (lotteries) as a method of
86 OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 3090) (1)). This cut-off exempts most pending applications for existing regulated
microwave services, such as applications for the first nine interactive Video Data Serv-
ices markets and pre-freeze wireless cable applications. See supra note 80.
87 OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(j) (1)).
88 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2)). Note
that prospective licensees must still qualify under the traditional criteria contained in
47 U.S.C. §§ 308(b) and 310 (relating to character and foreign ownership). There
are a number of conditions precedent and conditions subsequent to the FCC's use of
competitive bidding authority. For example, § 309(j)(10) requires that before the
FCC begins to auction licenses, the Secretary of Commerce must have submitted a
report on the reallocation of certain governmental frequencies which must contain
certain findings. Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 391 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(j) (10) (A)). Also, prior to auctions the FCC must have completed the PCS
rulemaking required by § 332(c) (1) (D). Id. § 6002(b), 107 Stat. at 394 (to be codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (1) (D)). Additionally, the FCC's auction authority will ex-
pire after two years if certain auctions do not occur on a timely basis. Id. § 6002(a),
107 Stat. at 391 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (10) (B)).
89 Statement of Sen. Inouye, supra note 80.
90 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 213, supra note 1, at 481-82 (incorporating by reference
BUDGET REPORT, supra note 1, at 253).
91 Id. See also Statement of Sen. Inouye, supra note 80.
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awarding licenses. The FCC may now only use random selection if
it first determines that it is not authorized to use competitive
bidding.92
Congress directed the FCC to design and test different meth-
odologies for auctioning off frequencies.9 3 In designing its meth-
odologies, the FCC must be responsive to certain goals:
(A) the development and rapid deployment of new tech-
nologies, products, and services for the benefit of the public,
including those residing in rural areas, without administrative or
judicial delay;
(B) promoting economic opportunity and competition and
ensuring that new and innovative technologies are readily acces-
sible to the American people by avoiding excessive concentra-
tion of licenses and disseminating licenses among a wide variety
of applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone com-
panies, and businesses owned by minority groups and women;
(C) recovery for the public of a portion of the value of the
spectrum resource made available for commercial use and
avoidance of unjust enrichment through the methods employed
to award uses of that resource; and
(D) efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic
spectrum.94
The FCC must promulgate rules outlining the methodologies it
will use for auctioning frequency by March 8, 1994."5 These rules
must consider alternative payment schedules and methods of calcula-
tion, including lump sums or guaranteed installment payments, with
or without royalty payments, or other schedules or methods that pro-
mote economic opportunity.96 They must also include performance
requirements, such as deadlines and penalties for performance fail-
ures, to ensure prompt delivery of service to rural areas, to prevent
spectrum "warehousing" and to promote investment in and rapid de-
ployment of new technologies.97 The regulations must prescribe area
designations and bandwidth assignments that promote an equitable
distribution of licenses and services among geographic areas and pro-
92 OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002(b) (1) (A), 107 Stat. at 392 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 309(i) (1)).
93 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (3)).
94 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 388 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(0 ) (3) (A)-(D)).
95 Id. § 6002(d) (1), 107 Stat. at 396.
96 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 389 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (4) (A)).
97 Id. § 6002 (a), 107 Stat. at 389 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309 0 ) (4) (B)-(C)).
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mote economic opportunity for a wide variety of applicants. They
must also ensure the participation of small businesses, rural telephone
companies, and businesses owned by minorities and women through
the use of tax certificates, bidding preferences and other methods.98
In addition, the FCC shall require transfer disclosures and other pro-
cedures to prevent unjust enrichment from the method used to dis-
tribute licenses.9 The FCC is granted discretion and is expressly not
prohibited from issuing whatever geographic size of licenses it deems
best whether national, regional, or local.'00
While one of the FCC's objectives is to raise revenues, considera-
tion of revenues in its rulemaking and assignment of frequencies is
expressly limited by the statute. In making a decision to assign a band
of frequencies to a use covered by section 3090)'s auction authority,
or in prescribing regulations to promote an equitable distribution of
licenses and service among geographic areas, to promote economic
opportunity among a wide variety of applicants, or to promote invest-
ment in and rapid deployment of new services and technologies, the
FCC is prohibited from considering the expectation of revenues from
auctioning frequency when making a finding of public interest, con-
venience or necessity.' 0 ' The FCC may, however, consider the expec-
tation of revenues when it promulgates regulations for alternative
payment schedules to promote a broad dissemination of licenses, but
it may not base its decision "solely or predominantly" on such expecta-
tion. 102 The FCC may continue to consider consumer demand for
services when making decisions.'03 The FCC must deposit all funds
spectrum auctions raise into the United States Treasury except for an
amount it is authorized to retain to offset the costs of the auction
procedure.10
4
The FCC's authority to use licensing is contingent upon the avail-
ability of additional spectrum for licensing. Unless the FCC complies
with the spectrum reallocation provisions of the National Telecommu-
nications and Information Administration Organization Act, the auc-
98 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 389 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (4) (D)).
99 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 389 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (4) (E)).
100 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 390 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (6) (F)).
101 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 390 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (7) (A)).
102 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 390 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (7) (B)).
103 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 390 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (7) ()).
104 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 390 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (8)). See also
id. § 6003, 107 Stat. at 397-400 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 159).
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tion authority will not become effective.' 0 Additionally, the auction
authority may lapse within two years from the date of enactment if the
FCC has not further complied with that Act'0 6 No later than Septem-
ber 30, 1997, the FCC must conduct public inquiry and submit a re-
port to Congress summarizing the revenues obtained from auctions,
describing the methodologies used, evaluating the advantages and dis-
advantages of those methodologies and recommending improve-
ments in the process.10 7 Unless reauthorized by Congress, the FCC's
auction authority will expire on September 30, 1998.10'
V. The PCS Allocation Decision
The 1994 PCS auction will be the first test of the new law. It is
essential to understand what is being offered for sale to decide
whether and how to participate, and also to evaluate the success of
the auction. The FCC has authorized PCS in the 2 GHz emerging
technologies bands.'0 9 The FCC allocated a total of 160 MHz at
1850-1970, 2130-2150 and 2180-2200 MHz for PCS services. This is
roughly four times the spectrum originally allocated for the cellu-
lar telephone service. The major elements of the FCC's allotment
order are:
- 120 MHz was allocated for licensed PCS services (1850-1890/
1930-1970 MHz and 2130-2150/2180-2200 MHz);
- 40 MHz was allocated for unlicensed PCS services (1890-1930
MHz);
- The licensed allocation was channelized into two 30 MHz
channel blocks, one 20 MHz channel block and four 10 MHz
channel blocks, as follows:
Channel Block Frequency (MHz) Service Area
A (30 MHz) 1850-1865/1930-1945 MTA
B (30 MHz) 1865-1880/1945-1960 MTA
C (20 MHz) 1880-1890/1960-1970 BTA
D (10 MHz) 2130-2135/2180-2185 BTA
E (10 MHz) 2135-2140/2185-2190 BTA
F (10 MHz) 2140-2145/2190-2195 BTA
105 Id. § 6002 (a), 107 Stat. at 391 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (10)). See also
id § 6001, 107 Stat. at 380 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 923)).
106 Id.
107 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 392 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (12)).
108 Id. § 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 392 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (11)).
109 See PCS Order, supra note 14.
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G (10 MHz) 2145-2150/2195-2200 BTA" 0
The unlicensed allocation was channelized into two 20 MHz
blocks, one for devices that will provide voice-like services and
one for devices that will provide data-like services, as follows:
Voice (isochronous) 1890-1900 and 1920-1930 MHz
Data (asychronous) 1900-1920 MHz"'
The FCC also determined the geographic coverage and dura-
tion of PCS licenses that will be offered at auction. The PCS ser-
vice area sizes were Major Trading Areas (MTAs) and Basic
Trading Areas (BTAs), as defined by the Rand McNally Atlas. In
the United States there are 51 MTA and 492 BTA-based service
areas under the plan adopted by the FCC.' 1 2 The licensing term is
set at ten years, with provisions for renewal expectancy similar to
those that currently apply to the cellular service."'
With regard to the critically important issue of eligibility for a
PCS license, an issue which was the subject of intense lobbying on
Capital Hill and at the FCC," 4 cellular licensees are permitted to
participate in PCS outside of their existing service areas or in any
110 PCS Order, supra note 14, at para. 56. The channel blocks consist of pairs of
spectrum to transmit and receive with a standard separation between the pairs. Id. at
para. 35.
111 Id. at paras. 79-92. A "spectrum etiquette" plan was adopted to govern the tech-
nical operation of unlicensed equipment. The Unlicensed PCS Ad Hoc Committee
for 2 GHz Microwave Transition and Management (UTAM) was conditionally desig-
nated as coordinator for use of unlicensed PCS devices. The FCC conditioned its
designation of UTAM upon its submitting an acceptable funding plan and stated that
it will solicit public comment on any such plan before deciding its acceptability. All
manufacturers of unlicensed PCS equipment would be required to participate in
UTAM. Id. at para. 88.
112 See PCS Order, supra note 14, at paras. 64-78. 47 MTAs and 487 BTAs are de-
fined in the RAND McNALLY, 1992 CommERcLAL ATLAs & MARKETING GUIDE paras. 36-
39 (123d ed. 1992). In addition to the MTAs and BTAs, the FCC licenses five insular
areas: American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands in a way that creates a total of 51 MTA and 492 BTA size licenses. 47
C.F.R. § 99.13 (1989). NTIA proposed that the FCC use 183 "economic areas defined
by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for PCS ser-
vice areas." Letter from LarryJ. Irving, NTIA Administrator, to James H. Quello, FCC
Acting Chairman (Sept. 14, 1993) (on file with the FCC, Washington, D.C., No. 90-
314).
113 See PCS Order, supra note 14, at paras. 130-31.
114 See Kirk Victor, Not Many Wires But Loads of Lobfyists, 38 NAT'LJ., 2251 (1993);
Cindy Skrzycki, Dingel" Let Markets Guide PCS Industry, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1993, at
F2; Letter from Rep. Markey (D-MA) to Chairman James H. Quello (Sept. 20, 1993)
(on file with the Seton Hall Legislative Journal); Letter from Rep. Dingell (D-MI) to
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area where the cellular licensee serves less than 10% of the popula-
tion of the PCS service area. Cellular licensees are defined as enti-
ties that have an ownership interest of 20% or more in a cellular
system. Cellular licensees also are permitted to compete for one of
the 10 MHz PCS channels in their existing service area. Local ex-
change carriers are permitted to apply for PCS licenses on the
same basis as other applicants, except insofar as they hold interests
in cellular operations."1 Eligibility for channel blocks C and D is
addressed in the companion notice of proposed rule making award
of PCS licenses through competitive bidding processes.11 6 That
Notice proposes licensing preferences for small businesses, rural
telephone companies and businesses owned by minorities and wo-
men. Licensees generally are authorized to aggregate up to 40
MHz in any one service area and may aggregate markets (service
areas) without restriction. Cellular licensees, however, are re-
stricted to only one 10 MHz channel block in their cellular service
area. Two PCS licensees will be required to offer service to at least
"one-third of the population in each market area within five years
of being licensed, two-thirds within seven years and 90% within ten
years." 7
VI. Develping Auction Rules for Assigning Spectrum Licenses
On September 23, 1993 the FCC adopted a Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making to implement its new authority to use actions to
award certain licenses."' At the outset, the FCC identified three
criteria to guide its design of the auction for PCS: (1) the auction
system should be simple and therefore, easy to administer; (2) it
Chairman James H. Quello (Sept. 21, 1993) (on file with the Seton Hall Legislative
Journal) [hereinafter Rep. Dingell letter].
115 PCS Order, supra note 14, at paras. 105-06.
116 Auction NPRM, supra note 11. See PCS Order, supra note 14, app. c at 18-19
(Small Business Advisory Committee Report) (on file with the FCC) (commenting on
opportunities for designated entities: small business, rural telephone, minority and
women owned business).
117 PCS Order, supra note 14, at para. 134. Technical standards were adopted for
PCS operations. These include antenna height and power limits and standards for
protecting existing microwave users and other PCS operations from interference.
These standards generally will provide microwave users with the same level of protec-
tion they are now afforded. The FCC has also encouraged industry to continue its
efforts to develop standards that will promote interoperability, roaming and en-
hanced emergency 911 capability for PCS. Id. at paras. 135-86.
118 Auction NPRM, supra note 11.
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should be shaped by the experience of other government agencies
which have effectively conducted auctions; and (3) the auctions
should be designed to minimize administrative costs to applicants
and to the FCC. l l 9
A. The Scope of Auctions
The FCC is required to use auctions if, among other things,
the service applied for principally involves the sale of communica-
tions services to subscribers for compensation. Based upon the
"subscribers for compensation" criterion, the FCC proposed to ex-
clude most mass media services from competitive bidding but
sought comment on the treatment of subscription services such as
Direct Broadcast Satellite. In addition, the FCC proposed exclud-
ing Public Safety Services, the Broadcast Auxiliary Service and serv-
ices provided on subcarrier channels from auctions. 2 '
The FCC tentatively concluded that competitive bidding
should begin in the immediate future for PCS and some services
regulated by the Private Radio and Common Carrier Bureaus, such
as common carrier radio services and Interactive Video Data Ser-
vice, and sought comment on the application of competitive bid-
ding procedures to these services.
B. Participation by Small Businesses, Rural Telephone Companies
and Businesses Owned by Women and Minorities
The FCC also sought comment on a variety of proposals
designed to meet the new law's requirement that small businesses,
rural telephone companies and businesses owned by women and
minorities be given an opportunity to participate in the competi-
tive bidding process.12 ' In this regard, the FCC specifically asked
for comments on setting aside blocks of spectrum for competitive
bidding by designated groups, spreading payment over time and
119 Id. at para. 18.
120 Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at para. 23. The FCC also sought comment on
how to measure the principal use of spectrum in certain services where private use
and service provided to subscribers for compensation are mixed. Id. at paras. 30-32.
The FCC also proposed auctions for licenses for intermediate radio links used as part
of a larger service offered for compensation (e.g. point-to-point microwave links that
are part of a cable television system). Id. at paras. 28-29.
121 Id. at paras. 72-76.
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tax certificates. 122 The FCC also sought comment on how to define
small business, rural telephone companies and businesses owned
by minorities and women for purposes of competitive bidding
rules.1
2 3
C. Bidding Method
The FCC proposed that, at least initially, oral biddings should
be the basic bidding method when the FCC has not explicitly speci-
fied some other method. 24 In making this tentative conclusion,
the FCC explained:
We find the benefits of oral auctions are generally more likely to
outweigh the costs of this method as well as the net benefits of
the other auction methods considered. Oral bidding is likely to
award licenses to the parties that value them the most and facili-
tate efficient aggregation of licenses when non-homogenous
licenses are offered individually.' 25
The FCC was confident that it would be able to adequately ad-
dress the main disadvantage of oral auctions: the potential for collu-
sion (oral auctions can also consume a great deal of time). The FCC
is also considering an "innovators bidding preference"-a credit up
to 10% of the applicants bid but was concerned about the prospect of
determining eligibility for such a credit prior to bidding.126
The FCC sought comment on the sequence in which licenses
should be offered when bidding is conducted sequentially. 127 For ex-
ample, should the FCC auction licenses for all geographic regions
within a spectrum block, in descending order of population, before
proceeding to auction licenses on the next spectrum block? The FCC
also asked for comment on the general concept of bidding to aggre-
gate groups of licenses-also known as combinational or "combinato-
rial" bidding-and on its tentative conclusions for implementation. 128
For those spectrum blocks where this method would be applied, the
122 Id. See also i&. at para. 121.
123 Id. at paras. 77-78. The FCC sought specific comment on the report submitted
on September 15, 1993, to the FCC by the Small Business Advisory Committee in its
PCS Order, supra note 14 (report on No. 90-314). Id. at para. 50.
124 Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at para. 46.
125 Id.
126 Id. at para. 50.
127 Id. at paras. 51-56.
128 IM. at paras. 57-62. See also Rep. Dingell letter, supra note 114; Auction NPRM,
supra note 11, at para. 61 n.40 (raising question regarding whether statutory authority
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FCC would accept bids both for licenses individually and for all the
individual licenses in block. Licenses would be awarded as a group if
a bid for the licenses as a group exceeded the sum of the highest bids
for the licenses individually. If the sum of the individual bids was
greater than the highest bid for the group, licenses would be awarded
individually. In either case, the same eligibility, performance and
other requirements would apply to each individual license.
The FCC tentatively concluded that in the initial application of
combinational bidding, it should first require submission of sealed
bids for pre-determined groups of licenses, then conduct oral auc-
tions for individual licenses and finally open the sealed bids. The FCC
also considered and sought comment on other elements of bidding
design including minimum bid requirements.
The FCC tentatively concluded and sought comment on requir-
ing lump sum payments for bidders not receiving preferences but also
sought comment on alternative payment methods for all licensees.129
The FCC sought comment on the size of up-front payments (deposits)
required to participate in the auction and requested comment on the
how it should treat winners and licensees who default on payments
owed the government.
D. PCS Auctions
The FCC tentatively proposed to use both oral and sealed bid-
ding in licensing PCS. 130 Oral bidding would be used in all cases
except for bids on groups of licenses. The FCC proposed to permit
combinational bidding to award all of the 51 MTA licenses on each
of two 30 MHz spectrum blocks (blocks A and B).1"1
The FCC also asked for comment on whether this procedure
should be used to facilitate grouping of PCS licenses within BTA
service areas. 132 Specifically, the FCC requested comment on
whether it should accept sealed bids for all BTA licenses on an
MTA basis and conduct oral auctions sequentially for individual
BTA licenses. Finally, the FCC sought comment on the use of this
combinational bidding to aggregate 10 MHz PCS licenses into 20
exists for this method of bidding). The term "combinatorial bidding" appears in Rep-
resentative Dingell's letter and its usage has since been adopted by the FCC.
129 Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at paras. 68-71.
130 Id at para. 120.
131 Id.
132 Id. at para. 123.
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MHz or 30 MHz blocks, thereby facilitating nationwide services.1 3
The FCC tentatively concluded that to ensure that small busi-
ness, rural telephone companies and businesses owned by minori-
ties and women have an opportunity to compete for broadband
PCS licenses, it would set aside one 20 MHz block of spectrum to
be licensed on a BTA basis (Block C) for these designated
groups.134 In addition, it proposed that qualifying bidders compet-
ing for licenses in this block be permitted to pay their winning bid
over time and that their qualifying deposit be less than that re-
quired by non-designated groups competing for other blocks of
spectrum.135 The FCC also sought comment on how tax certifi-
cates might be used to facilitate the deployment of PCS by minority
or women licensees.
The FCC addressed three safeguards for the auction process:
preventing unjust enrichment, performance requirements and
prohibitions against collusion.316 The statute requires the FCC to
"require such transfer disclosures and antitrafficking restrictions
and payment schedules as may be necessary to prevent unjust en-
richment as a result of the methods employed to issue licenses and
permits."'1 37 The FCC also proposed performance requirements to
ensure prompt delivery of service and to prevent warehousing of
spectrum and sought comment on procedures to prevent collusion
among bidders.13 8
E. Application Procedures and Deposit Requirements
With regard to application procedures, the FCC tentatively
concluded that it should adopt a two-part application form for auc-
tion services. 1 9 The short-form application would include certifi-
cations regarding the prospective bidder's qualifications and, if
applicable, eligibility for the special procedures open to those in
economic opportunity groups designated by the statute. The FCC
133 Id. at pra. 124.
'34 Id at para. 121.
'35 I&
136 I. at paras. 82-94.
37 OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002, 107 Stat. at 389 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309 j) (4) (E)).
138 Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at paras. 90-92.
'39 Id at paras. 96-101.
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tentatively concluded that it would examine the long-form applica-
tions of auction winners only.
The FCC tentatively concluded that, to realize the Act's goals
of ensuring prompt delivery of service and promoting rapid de-
ployment of new technology, it should adopt procedures that limit
bidding to serious, qualified bidders and minimize the probability
that, after an auction is competed and participants have dispersed,
the FCC finds that it cannot award a license to the auction winner.
The FCC therefore proposed that, to participate in an auction, bid-
ders would be required to tender in advance to the FCC a substan-
tial up-front payment. 40 The amount of the payment would vary
with the license being auctioned and would be announced well in
advance of the auction via a Public Notice. 14 1
In order to provide bidders with appropriate incentives to en-
sure they are, in fact, qualified, financially and otherwise, to be
awarded a license, the FCC proposed to retain the up-front pay-
ments of auction winners even if they are later disqualified.' 42 The
FCC also sought comment on a proposal that, either immediately
or within one or two business days, auction winners be required to
tender additional non-refundable payment to the FCC sufficient to
bring its total deposit up to 20% of its bid.143
VH. Regulatory Issues
The foregoing overview is but a bare summary of the myriad of
issues that will be addressed by the FCC about how to run its spec-
trum auctions. The principal insight that might be offered about
the pending rulemaking is how many details remain to be decided
and how much change is likely for even the most basic elements of
the proposed auction rule as tentatively announced by the FCC in
the September launch of the rulemaking. The number of specific
questions posed by the FCC in the NPRM is extraordinary. Funda-
mental elements of the auction design such as the proposal to use
oral bidding and the mechanisms of the application and qualifica-
tion process are hardly set in stone. Accordingly, the rulemaking
140 Id. at paras. 102-09.
141 Id. The proposal is two cents per person residing in the license area per
megahertz. So, for example, the upfront payment for a 30 Mhz MTA with a popula-
tion of 20 million would be $20 million x 30 x .02 = $12 million.
142 Id. at para. 104.
143 1d
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will prove to be unusually important in fleshing out the specifics of
the auction design. The rulemaking also promises to be a process
where major players will, as they have done during the considera-
tion of all the FCC docket items relating to the creation of PCS,
exert a massive effort to shape the rules to their advantage.
The FCC needs to make the auction process simple and
straightforward or else it may not work. The FCC has done a very
good job on short notice of addressing the complexity of auctions
for seven spectrum bands and 51 MTAs and 492 BTAs. Still, bid-
ders who wish to compete for more than even a few spectrum lots
face great challenges in planning their bidding strategy because of
the sequential nature of the proposed bidding structure and the
nature of bidding for different licenses in each of the frequency
blocks. What a bidder is willing to pay for a particular license de-
pends, among other things, on what the bidder has already paid,
what others paid and who won other related licenses. It will, for
example, be a great challenge for firms wishing to obtain a large
number of licenses to give advance bidding instructions to their
bidders. Participation in numerous sequential oral auctions, for
example, combined with the difficulty of valuing the various fre-
quency blocks (which in turn will vary in value according to the
location of microwave incumbents in each auction spectrum lot)
will require bidders to formulate extensive and complex bidding
strategies.
Confusion caused by complexity can lead to irrational bid-
ding, unnecessary risk, and extreme results, such as winning bids
that are either far too low or what is known as the "winners curse,"
winning bids that are far too high, i.e. winning when you wished
you had not won. The current multiple auction procedure will not
only tax the decision-making ability of even the most sophisticated
and well financed bidders, but it also increases the chance that de-
faults or other problems occur that possibly might require redoing
all or part of the auction. This possibility must be avoided if at all
possible not only because of the chaos that would result but be-
cause of the enormous waste it would cause in terms of unneces-
sary transaction costs for private parties, duplication of
administrative costs and waste of agency resources and delay. Fi-
nally, the FCC does not have much room for error. Its very first
auction will be for the critically important PCS auctions and it will
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not be able to conduct any trial runs on other smaller auctions to
work out bugs.
According to Professors Barry Nalebuff and Jeremy Bulow,
one solution would be to combine auctions for different band
blocks and thereby reduce the number of auctions the FCC would
have to run. Running separate auctions in seven bands is unneces-
sary and the same statutory and regulatory objectives could be ac-
complished by consolidating the auctions into four bands. Under
the Nalebuff and Bulow proposal, there would be one auction for
each of the two 30 MHz blocks within an MTA, one auction for
three of the 10 MHz blocks within a BTA, and then auctions for the
remaining 20 MHz and 10 MHz blocks that have been set aside for
the various designated entities. The way the 30 MHz auctions
would work is, for example, the top two bidders would each win a
license and the higher of the two bidders would get first choice.
The highest bidder would thus pay a premium according to the
value he places on being able to choose between the two 30 MHz
blocks. For the 10 MHz band blocks, the top three bidders would
each be awarded a license with the highest bidders getting first
choice. This format could work in either a sealed bid or open bid
auction.
According to Nalebuff and Bulow:
The theoretical result from auctions literature predicts that
selling two identical products sequentially yields the same ex-
pected revenue as selling them simultaneously. In the case of
sequential auctions, each should have the same price. Other-
wise, a firm would choose to wait for the second auction if it was
thought to have the lower price or bid higher in the first round
if that was perceived to be the better deal.
There is also an efficiency justification for running one auc-
tion rather than two in sequence. Wn there is only one auction,
the two highest bidders will always win. Since we believe that bids
are positively correlated with valuations, that means that the
licenses will always go to the two firms with the highest values.
In contrast, when the auctions are run in sequence, it is possible
that someone other than the top two bidders might win the first
auction. In the first auction, the "true" top two bidders each
mistakenly think that they are the only other person who values
the license at the winning price. As a result, in the second auc-
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tion the price goes much higher and one of the efficient firms
fails to get a license.
The culprit is bidding complexity and the role of strategic
bidding. When there are two auctions you have to develop a
strategy for bidding in the first versus second auction. With only
one auction, you don't have to consider this issue and there is
no room to outsmart yourself. By eliminating the need for stra-
tegic bidding, we also eliminate the possibility of having an inef-
ficient auction outcome.
14
The PCS band blocks are not exactly identical primarily because
of the different incumbents that might be located in each particular
spectrum lot. But the different lots that Nalebuff and Bulow proposed
combining are otherwise relatively fungible. The ability to choose first
for making the highest bid is not any different than the result of a
committed bidder raising his or her bid in a separate single auction to
achieve the same result. This proposal also worked with the FCC's
proposed experiment to permit "combinatorial" bidding for the two
30 MHz MTA spectrum blocks. Parties could submit a national sealed
bid and the FCC would then conduct one open sequential auction for
all of the MHz MTAs on an MTA-by-MTA basis. For each MTA the top
two bidders would be identified and the results totalled. Then the
national bids would be opened and the winners would be chosen by
determining the higher two bids out of the national and the two total
combined MTA bids. One national license would be awarded if the
highest national bid exceeded the sum of the highest regional bid.
Two national licenses would be awarded if both national bids ex-
ceeded the sum of the highest regional combined bid.
Making the upcoming PCS auctions simpler in this way would
help bidders to focus on other aspects of the process and perhaps
reduce resources spent on calculating the different value of each fre-
quency band. Of course, this approach is simpler for the FCC because
it reduces the number of auctions (from seven band blocks to four
band blocks).
Under the FCC's proposed auction method, nationwide "combi-
national" bidders currently stand at a disadvantage compared to re"
gional MTA bidders in the open auction because the participants in
144 BarryJ. Nalebuff & Jeremy I. Bulow, Designing the PCS Auction, in Comments of
Bell Atlantic Personal Communications, Inc., Implementation of Section 309(j) of the
Communications Act Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, Nov. 10, 1993, app.
a at 4-5 [hereinafter Nalebuff & Bulow] (on file with the FCC, Washington, D.C.).
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the open MTA Auction obtain information about the value of various
MTA lots as the open auction proceeds. In contrast, nationwide bid-
ders make sealed bids prior to the open auction, and are thus ex-
tremely susceptible to the "winner's curse." Lacking information
concerning the true value of PCS licenses, the highest nationwide bid-
ders will, on average, be far more likely to overbid for them.' 45 Know-
ing this, nationwide bidders will tend to adjust their bids downward to
avoid the winner's curse. 146 As Nalebuff and Bulow observe, this will
render it quite unlikely that a firm will be able to bid aggressively
enough to win a national license even if there are large economies of
scale and scope. 147 Bidders in the open MTA auctions, on the other
hand, are much less susceptible to the winner's curse because it is
interactive and each new bid conveys information to the other bid-
ders. To the extent that the open bidding process reduces uncer-
tainty, it helps the regional bidders to avoid the winner's curse. The
FCC's auction design should not disadvantage national bidders in this
fashion, particularly because it is neither equitable nor efficient to do
so and need not do so because there are many alternative designs
from which to choose.14  By putting national regional bidders on a
145 When the market value of an object is uncertain, each bidder must estimate the
object's true worth. In the presence of such uncertainty, auction theory indicates
that, on average, the highest estimate will be too high. Thus, if the bidder with the
highest estimate of the value of the object offers the winning bid for it and fails to
take account of this bias, this bid will, on average, also be too high. Economists call
this phenomenon the "winner's curse." See CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at 45; Nalebuff
& Bulow, supra note 144, app. a at 15-16.
146 See CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at 45.
147 Nalebuff & Bulow, supra note 144, app. a at 12.
148 There are many ways to mitigate the winner's curse of the combinational bid-
ders for national licenses. The regional open auctions could be held first. This of
course puts the MTA bidders at a disadvantage. Half of the regional auctions could
be held before the national bids are required to be submitted. Alternatively, both the
regional and national bids could be sealed. But this would make both susceptible to
the winner's curse. Id at 14-16.
An informal idea raised by Professor Nalebuff is that the FCC could consider
giving national bidders the option, instead of submitting a numerical price in their
sealed bid, of submitting a percentage premium that they will pay over the sum of
their regional bids. Meetings with Barry J. Nalebuff, Professor of Economics and
Management, Yale School of Organization and Management, Yale University, in New
Haven, Conn. (Oct. 1993). For example, a sealed nationwide bid could be an offer to
bid 10% above the sum of a bidder's regional bids. Thus, if the sum of the regional
bids is $100 million, the bidder's national bid is $110 million.
The advantage of this proposal is that, although national bidders still remain at
an informational disadvantage relative to the regional bidders as to the value of re-
gional and national PCS licenses, they can calculate the relative value of a combined
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better informational footing, the FCC would help to assure that PCS
licenses will reach their truly highest valued use: whether it be aggre-
gated as a national package or auctioned off to different entities
individually.
The FCC has proposed reserving one 20 MHz (Block C) and
one 10 MHz (Block D) for bidders representing small businesses,
rural telephone companies and minority and female-owned
businesses. 149 Conducting separate auctions for each of these two
blocks would be a sensible way to administer the set asides given
the technically significant difference in the frequencies of each
block.'50 Moreover, to the extent that the FCC itself has raised the
possibility of legal and constitutional concerns surrounding the viabil-
ity of the set-asides for designated entities,' running these auctions
separately will minimize the possibility that any legal challenges or de-
fects will affect the process of auctioning the other PCS licenses. The
FCC has been encouraged to adopt a variety of measures to promote
participation of the designated entities in the auctions. Such meas-
ures include installment payment plans with interest for the set-aside
bid and assemble a winning national network that way as compared to bidding MTA-
by-MTA. Alternatively, bidders who do not plan to bid for every MTA can neverthe-
less calculate the percentage value above the open bids they intend to place that they
would be willing to pay to obtain a national license. Once bidding begins for the
MTA auctions, much more information will be revealed about the value of PCS
licenses. Because national bidders will have bid a percentage premium rather than a
fixed price, they will be able to retain control over their national bids through their
regional bidding, and will no longer have to bid conservatively to avoid the winner's
curse. Id. National bidders who do not wish to participate in any regional bidding or
those who wish to bid only on a few MTAs obviously cannot submit a percentage
premium as their sealed bid. In contrast, bidders may not wish to participate in each
and every region, but may participate in enough that a premium percentage of bids
they made might be a winning bid. Such parties might be willing to take regional
licenses if they could get them in this way even though they would not bid for them
individually. For these reasons, national bidders should be given the option of sub-
mitting either a specific dollar amount price or a percentage premium.
149 See OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002, 107 Stat. at 388-89 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309 0) (3) (C), (j) (4) (D)).
150 The 20 MHz allocation is paired in the "lower" band at 1880-1890/1960-1970
MHz, while the proposed 10 MHz is paired in the "upper" band at 2130-2135/2180-
2185 MHz.
151 See Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at paras. 72-74. See also PCS Order, supra
note 14, dissenting Statement of Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett at 4, where Com-
missioner Barrett stated that "set-asides for small businesses may or may not be con-
templated by Public Law 103-66, and will require further, significant debate on the
record at the FCC before they can be established. I do not expect that this debate will
occur without controversy."
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blocks, the use of tax certificates as proposed by the FCC's Small Busi-
ness Advisory Committee, as well as encouraging designated entities to
partner with established entities in the wireless and wired industries to
form PCS consortion.
152
Although section 309 0 ) requires the FCC to impose "such trans-
fer disclosures and anti-trafficking requirements as may be necessary
to prevent unjust enrichment," this concern is greatly reduced in the
auction (as opposed to the lottery) context.15 3 As noted in the legisla-
tive history to the Budget Act, "[i] n a system of open competitive bid-
ding, trafficking in licenses should be minimal, since the winning
bidder will have paid a market price for the license."' 54 In an unlim-
ited bidding process, resale of the license will involve no unjust en-
richment. Accordingly, there is little reason to impose restrictions on
the subsequent transferability of PCS licenses.
The one exception may be the proposed set-asides for designated
entities. Restricting bidder participation to designated certain groups
creates a risk that the auction will not realize the full market value of
the licenses, the auction winners could be able to "flip" their licenses
for a profit in the aftermarket instead of building out and operating
PCS systems in the manner that Congress intended. The potential
disparity between auction price and market value could also create
incentives for those uninterested in developing PCS to manipulate the
auction process through designated entities. To address this possibil-
ity the FCC proposed imposing upon designated entities a system of
financial disincentives on early transfer restrictions. 155 Such restric-
tions, while preventing speculative gain, could compound difficulties
already experienced by the designated entities in attracting necessary
capital. Permitting the free transferability of PCS licenses among all
designated entities, such that any "set-aside" PCS licenses will remain
in the hands of those intended to receive preference while providing
adequate safeguard against unacceptable trafficking, permits the des-
ignated entities some flexibility in obtaining needed financing.
152 See PCS Order, supra note 14, app. c at 18-19 (Small Business Advisory Commit-
tee Report); Comments of Bell Atlantic Personal Communications, Inc., Implementa-
tion of Section 3090) of the Communications Act Competitive Bidding, PP Docket
No. 93-253, Nov. 10, 1993, at 15-16 (on file with the FCC, Washington, D.C.).
153 OBRA, supra note 1, § 6002, 107 Stat. at 389 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(j) (4) (E)).
154 BuDGET REPORT, supra note 1, at 257.
155 Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at paras. 84-85.
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With respect to performance requirements for PCS, the FCC has
already specified a time table for PCS license holders to "build out"
their systems and serve increasing numbers of subscribers.156 As long
as the FCC permits the free transfer of PCS licenses, and the auctions
result in fair market prices for the licenses, spectrum licenses are un-
likely to be "warehoused" by PCS licensees. As the FCC observes, the
cost of warehousing spectrum is the value of foregone uses that could
be made of the license (either by the licensee or by others to whom
the license could be sold). Licenses purchased at auctions should
have a purchase price which deters warehousing.
To the extent that many of the FCC's proposals involve the use of
open auctions, the FCC has also recognized that this system of bidding
"may be more subject to manipulation and collusion."' 57 The FCC
therefore has requested comment on ways in which it can prevent
such behavior.
As Nalebuff and Bulow observe, the susceptibility of open English
auctions to manipulative bidding allows a bidding ring to rapidly esca-
late bids and with the initial winner defaulting to a bidder partner
who placed the second highest, but artificially low bid.'5 For exam-
ple, if Bidder 1 offers $1 million and then Bidder 2 offers $50 million,
those who might have submitted bids falling in the interval between
those of Bidder 1 and Bidder 2 never has the opportunity to do so. In
the face of Bidder l's default, the FCC has suggested that it would re-
run the auction rather than award the license to Bidder 2,159 which
would be an extremely undesirable and costly result.
There are several ways in which the FCC can prevent the escala-
tion and default scenario in an open auction. First, the FCC could
accept "losing" bids after the auction ends. In the event that an artifi-
cially inflated winner forfeits, the FCC can then award the license to
the next highest bidder, taking into account all of the bids made dur-
ing the auction as well as the backup bids. This effectively prevents
such high bids to be placed in the first instance, but at a minimum will
prevent the necessity of having to re-run the auction because collusion
can no longer create an artificially low losing bid-other bidders will
156 See PCS Order, supra note 14, at 54-55.
157 Auction NPRM, supra note 11, at para. 38.
158 Nalebuff & Bulow, supra note 144, at 10-12.
159 Id.
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have been given the opportunity to "fill in" the interval.16 °
A second solution to this problem is to allow no wild 'jumps" in
bidding by mandating that bidders not be allowed to increase their
bids beyond certain pre-specified increments (i.e., bidders can only
raise their bids by $100,000 increments). This, too, would prevent a
party from preemptive bidding.1
6
A third solution to the manipulation and default problem would
be for the FCC to adopt a variation of the open English auction called
the 'Japanese auction." Here once bidders start bidding by raising
hands or pushing buttons, they must keep bidding while the auction-
eer raises the bidding by pre-specified increments or drop out for
good. Bidders drop out as the price ascends beyond what they are
willing to pay, and they may not re-enter the bidding once they drop
out. Bidding escalates until only the winning bidders remain.
As Nalebuff and Bulow explain, a Japanese auction run in this
fashion not only helps prevent parties from blocking others from bid-
ding by rapidly escalating the bids, but has the added advantage of
reducing the winner's curse.162 This is because bidders have more
information than they do in any open English auction about how
many bidders remain in the competition. Although theoretical auc-
tion literature predicts that prices will go slightly higher in a Japanese
auction (with more information, there is less concern about the win-
ner's curse, and more incentive to bid aggressively), the structure of
the auctions eliminates the possibility of someone jumping in with a
wildly irrational bid that could be more likely to yield a default. 6 '
While there are many steps the FCC can take to control the auc-
tion process, the FCC has far less control over unscrupulous market-
ing of get rich schemes to the public. Perversely, the stricter the
requirements for participating in auctions, the more complicated it is
for individual small investors to participate, and the easier it is for
promoters of application and auction services to convince unwary in-
vestors that they provide a necessary and indispensable service in help-
ing the individual navigate the regulatory requirements. In reality, if
the cellular and wireless experience are any indication, these so-called
services often have little concern about whether their license applica-
160 Id. This is a desirable safeguard because the FCC will likely never have to use it
once bidders have been apprised that the mechanism is in place. Id. at 11 n.ll.
161 Id. at 11.
162 I at 11-12.
163 Id.
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tions comply with regulatory requirements or are even facially defec-
tive. Their primary objective is separating individuals from their
wallets.
Given the large amounts of money likely to be involved in the
upcoming auctions and in light of the elevated rhetoric about the
market value of the licenses, it is a virtual certainty that efforts will
soon begin to raise money from small investors with unrealistic
promises of high profits and low risk. Appropriate law enforcement
authorities would be well advised to anticipate these activities and to
take precautions such as issuing investor alerts and monitoring pro-
motions that soon will appear in television and printed advertise-
ments. Industry groups can be relied on to cooperate with law
enforcement and regulators to protect investors from fraud.1'
A final word is warranted about the inflated expectations for the
revenue raising potential of the upcoming auctions. A careful reading
of all of the congressional budget analysis on this subject reveals just
how tenuous are even the best available revenue projections. 65 In
plain words, no one really knows until the bidding starts what spec-
trum licenses will bring at auctions. In some instances, bidding for
MTAs in densely populated major markets such as California, New
York and Chicago, particular businesses may place such a premium on
winning a license to compliment their existing market business inter-
ests that bids could dramatically exceed expectations. More generally,
however, bidders will be constrained by the very substantial other costs
connected with building out an ill-defined and interested PCS busi-
ness. As this writing, it is difficult to be more precise than acknowl-
edging that auctions will not, in themselves, eliminate the federal
deficit, although they have reasonable promise of raising significant
revenue.
VI/. Conclusion
The new spectrum auction law evokes one of the biggest
changes in the history of United States regulation of the airwaves
since the sinking of the Titanic led the federal government to seize
164 See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert L. Schmidt, Wireless Cable Ass'n Int'l Inc.,
Policy Statement on Investment Proposal (Nov. 4, 1993) (on file with the Seton Hall
LegislativeJournal).
165 CBO emphasizes that its estimates are highly uncertain. See CBO STtmy, supra
note 3, at 22, 33-38. Estimates are based on assumptions that may not reflect current
allocation rules or auction methodology. Id. at i-xiii, 39-46.
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control of the airwaves. 16 6 It is probable that the success or failure
of the FCC in this decade, as the country heads into the 21st Cen-
tury expectant of an advanced, affordable network of communica-
tions and information services, will be judged largely by what is
accomplished in fulfilling the high expectations for spectrum auc-
tions. The record of the FCC in the array of regulatory issues on its
agenda such as regulating cable rates, promoting competition in
the local telephone market and other such important matters
could be over-shadowed if the new spectrum auction law is imple-
mented in a way that raises significant revenues for the deficit rid-
den federal treasury, streamlines and enhances the fairness of the
FCC's assignment process, and most of all, serves to propel rather
than impede the availability to the public of emerging new technol-
ogies and related services.
In this regard, the FCC is in a difficult and somewhat precari-
ous position. The expectations for the revenue potential of the
auctions may be greatly overstated. The recent PCS allotment deci-
sions are unlikely to help. The decision not to offer nationwide
licenses is a prime example. A reality check is in order. The Con-
gressional Budget Office freely concedes how problematic it is to
project the auction revenues and many of the assumptions in its
analysis are inconsistent with the FCC's allotments and tentative
auction procedure."6 7 It is appropriate to refine and obtain more
realistic projections of what revenues should be, recognizing that
the dizzying pace of market developments such as AT&T's acquisi-
tion of McCaw, the recent spate of telco-cable deals, and the BT
acquisition of MCI, could have a dramatic external pressure on
auction prices either way.
Similarly, expectations are over-inflated for the prospects of
auctions to curtail shams, chicanery and speculation. The hustlers
166 Georgetown University Law Professor Thomas G. Krattenmaker explains the
causal link between the sinking of the Titanic and the passage of the Radio Act of
1912. In brief, the congressional investigation into the disaster revealed that the Ti-
tanic's distress calls had been received by the Marconi station in Newfoundland. Am-
ateur radio interference along the east coast prevented the signals from reaching
potential rescuers in the vicinity of the Titanic. The Titanic incident helped to propel
efforts to obtain government control of the airwaves. The history is vividly portrayed
in greater detail in THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER & LUCAS A. PoWE, JR., REGULATING
BROADcAsr PROGRAMMING (forthcoming 1994) (draft on file with Thomas G. Krat-
tenmaker, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Center).
167 CBO STUDY, supra note 3, at ix-xiii, 33-38, 43-47.
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are hard to stop. They can't help themselves when the stakes are as
high, for example, as they are in the PCS market. The FCC has
been unfairly pilloried in the past for actions that are often beyond
their control. And auctions are not golden bullets that will kill all
swindles. Fraud is a matter for appropriate law enforcement and
consumer protection authorities and they would be well advised to
be on alert prior to the auctions, rather than to try to respond after
the fact as in the cellular and wireless cable experiences. More-
over, the FCC's ability to restrain unfair windfalls and trafficking
on one hand and warehousing of licenses on the other are con-
strained by the economic need for an efficient secondary market.
Restrictions on post-auction transactions will diminish the value of
the licenses and consequently auction revenues as well. Such re-
strictions could also frustrate rapid development of new
technologies.
There will be less of an excuse if the auctions become an ad-
ministrative quagmire rather than a marked improvement over
comparative hearings and lotteries. There really is sufficient time
to get it right and the FCC should and, under the statute, can af-
ford to pay outside consultants to get this procedure right. After
all, if an auction can be briskly run at an estate sale of odd lots of
baubles and some treasures, and all involved can leave feeling the
result has been fair and a good measure of value, then the FCC
should be able to conduct auctions of a package of infinitely more
fungible goods-different spectrum lots.
While PCS will arrive, the questions of when and what have yet
to be answered. PCS has been so hyped that it is inevitable that
expectations will not be fully really realized in the immediate fu-
ture. If there are problems with the FCC auctions, these in turn
might be blamed for almost inevitable snags in the roll-out of PCS
even if the delay is, in reality, unrelated to the auctions.
There is then the potential for the FCC to take a very big fall
and the stage is littered with banana peels. Still there is also reason
to believe that the FCC is up to the challenge. For six decades, the
FCC has not raised any revenue from licensing richly valuable spec-
trum. Even if the auctions begin to generate very substantial sums,
which do not meet Congressional estimates, this will be a major
positive change-and should be perceived as such. There is also
good reason to believe that many problems associated with com-
parative hearings and lotteries can be avoided. The Department of
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Justice, the Federal Trade Commission and the National Associa-
tion of State Attorneys General have become active and should be
able to take steps that will protect investors and consumers. Ad-
ministratively, it will not take too much progress to create and man-
age an assignment process that is a marked improvement over the
past, a process that encourages investment, innovation and busi-
ness growth.
Any concept of the nation's future communications infrastruc-
ture includes a vast array of wireless technologies as a major part of
the network. The opportunities are great, the obstacles are real
and the need of the United States economy and the public forjobs
and services are acute. The success of spectrum auctions will be a
critical step in assuming that the telecommunications sector
achieves its full potential.
